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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD MADSEN and NANCY MADSEN, 
his wife, for themselves and 
all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs 
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS & 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Supreme Court No. 860148 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Were Prudential's affidavits supporting the Motion for 
Disqualification "legally sufficient" within the meaning of 
Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? 
RULE AND ETHICAL CANON DETERMINATIVE OF REVIEW 
Determination of the appeal requires study of Rule 
63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (reproduced in 
Addendum D) and Canon 3 of the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct 
(reproduced in Addendum E). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Statement of the Nature of the Case 
This is an action for an accounting of profits 
allegedly earned on "budget payments". They are funds 
collected monthly by Prudential as mortgagee for payment of 
taxes and hazard insurance premiums on mortgaged property. 
The Course of Proceedings 
The Madsens filed their complaint on February 27, 
1975, in the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake 
County. The complaint subsequently was amended, which prompted 
removal of the action to the nnited States District Court for 
the District of Utah. It was remanded in 1984. The action was 
tried by Judge Kenneth Rigtrup, without a jury, on September 4, 
5, and 6, 1985. 
Disposition in the Court Below 
On October 15, 1985, Prudential filed a motion to 
disqualify Judge Rigtrup. The motion was granted on March 24, 
1986, by Judge Philip R. Fishier. This interlocutory appeal of 
the disqualification order followed. 
COUNTER-STATEMENT OF FACTS 
(i) The Underlying Legal Claims of the Parties. 
This action was brought against Prudential Federal 
Savings & Loan Association by two of its borrowers, Richard and 
Nancy Madsen. In 19 64, the Madsens borrowed money from 
Prudential on a first trust deed. In addition to monthly 
payments of principal and interest, the trust deed required 
monthly payments to Prudential of one-twelfth the estimated 
property taxes and hazard insurance premiums due-annually on 
the property. These "budget payments" were held by Prudential 
until needed to pay the taxes and insurance premiums, and they 
also were "pledged" to Prudential as additional security for 
-2-
repayment of the the loan. The Madsens contend the budget 
payments were theirs, that Prudential used them and earned 
profits, and they seek those profits. (R. 59-86.) 
The Madsens* current complaint, the Substitute Third 
Amended Complaint, alleges a plaintiff class composed of all 
borrowers in Utah who have trust deeds similar to the 
Madsens'. The class members assert their claims against an 
alleged defendant class composed of all Utah lenders who use 
trust deeds with language "in substance and effect" similar to 
the Madsens' trust deed. (R. 59-86.) 
1
 The trust deed provides: 
A. To protect the security of this Deed of Trust, TRUSTOR 
agrees: 
. . . 
2. To keep the buildings . . . insured against loss by 
fire . . ., and to pay the premiums therefore promptly when due 
4. To pay before delinquent all taxes and assessments 
affecting said property . . . 
In addition to the monthly payments as provided in said 
note, the TRUSTOR agrees to pay to the BENEFICIARY, upon the 
same day each month, budget payments estimated to equal 
one-twelfth of the annual taxes and insurance premiums; said 
budget payments to be adjusted from time to time as required, 
and said budget payments are hereby pledged to the BENEFICIARY 
as additional security for the full performance of this deed of 
trust and the note secured hereby. The budget payments so 
accumulated may be withdrawn by the BENEFICIARY for the payment 
of taxes or insurance premiums due on the premises. The 
BENEFICIARY may at any time, without notice, apply said budget 
payments to the payment of any sums due under the terms of this 
deed of trust and the note secured hereby or either of them. 
TRUSTOR'S failure to pay said budget payments shall constitute 
a default under this trust. 
(R. 6.) 
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This action was assigned to Judge Kenneth Rigtrup in 
1984. Prior to the assignment, Judge Rigtrup was then already 
presiding over four other similar cases: 
(a) Roger Hal Read and Elizabeth W. Read, for 
themselves and all others similarly situated, vs. American 
Equity Corporation, for itself and all others similarly 
situated; Civil No. C-244219; plaintiffs were represented 
by Robert J. DeBry and defendant was represented by Edward 
J. McDonough of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough. 
(R. 113.) 
(b) James W. Petty and Mary E. Petty, for themselves 
and all others similarly situated, vs. Western Savings & 
Loan Company, a Utah corporation; Civil No. C-79-700; 
plaintiffs were represented by Robert J. DeBry and 
defendant was represented by Richard W. Giauque of Giauque 
& Williams. (R. 113.) 
(c) Russell R. Everill and Helen B. Everill, for 
themselves and all others similarly situated, vs. Western 
Savings & Loaa Company; Civil No. C-79-701; plaintiffs were 
represented by Robert J. DeBry and defendant was 
represented by Richard W. Giauque. (R. 113.) 
(d) Ernest H. Dixon and Lori Ann P. Dixon, for 
themselves and all others similarly situated, vs. United 
Savings & Loan Association; Civil No. C-79-1105; plaintiffs 
were represented by Robert J. DeBry and defendant was 
represented by John P. Ashton of Prince, Yeates & 
Geldzahler. (R. 114.) 
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Prudential appeared as amicus curiae in each of those four 
cases. The Utah Bankers Association, an association 
representing banks domiciled in the State of Utah, participated 
as amicus curiae in this action and in the four other cases in 
order to counsel the court on the defendant class allegations. 
The Association was represented by Peter W. Billings, Sr. of 
Fabian & Clendenin. (R. 112-114.) 
(ii) Judge Rigtrup's Conduct Giving Rise to Disqualification. 
This action was tried by Judge Rigtrup on September 4, 
5, and 6, 1985. The Madsens and Prudential both rested on 
Friday, September 6th. Immediately at the close of trial on 
the 6th, Judge Rigtrup began to rule from the bench: 
THE COURT: I had thought earlier that I might go 
home and spend some time with the case, but I've 
decided that I'd rather let you gentlemen twist and 
turn for the weekend, rather than me. So I'll share 
the benefits of my decision with you at this point. 
. . . I have had incremental kinds of suffering 
for four years in that these two lawyers have tested 
me, they have twisted me and they have pulled and 
tugged me and jerked and proposed every conceivable 
concept that you could come up with, and the 
substance—I'll expose my biases and my prejudices and 
be very frank with you. I think there are some 
substantial kinds of policy things that have really 
caused me great trouble and trauma. As I've indicated 
earlier, and no objection was interposed, I was a 
customer of Prudential Federal Savings and Loan 
Association and paid without default for 25 years at 
four and three-quarters percent, and I knew that was 
such a fine deal that my wife couldn't get me to 
remodel or move or anything because I was 23 years old 
when I first took the mortgage out, and I computed 
that out and I thought, why, those robbers, they are 
charging me twice what I'm borrowing from them, and 
that's unfair. As I got older and more sophisticated, 
I — 
-5-
MR. PALMER: Your Honor, I hate to interrupt, but 
I need to make the point that this is news to me, that 
you had been a customer of Prudential. 
THE COURT: I indicated that on several occasions. 
MR. PALMER: I beg the Court's pardon, but that 
is news to me. I don't recall that at all—if anybody 
else does—recall telling me that, and I— 
THE COURT: I indicated that in these earlier 
meetings that I had paid my loan off at some point, 
and I'd had a loan with Prudential Federal Savings. 
MR. PALMER: Perhaps the Court is thinking of 
conferences with other counsel. The reason I make the 
point is— 
THE COURT: My earlier conferences were not with 
the two of you in this case, they were with Mr. 
Billings, with Mr. Ashton, with you, with Mr. Giaque 
[sic], Mr. McDonough, with respect to whoever he 
represents. It was Mr. Giauque or someone from that 
office. They were a corrective [sic] kind of deal. 
MR. PALMER: In any event, I stand to raise the 
point now that it is news to us. I believe if—I take 
it that the Court did not feel that it had any 
prejudice because of that. 
THE COURT: No. 
MR. PALMER: All right. 
THE COURT: I have a recollection that somewhere 
along the line I did make that disclosure. I don't 
know how you could be apart of the community and be a 
home owner and not have borrowed from someone. And so 
I think I made it very clear in one of those 
collective kinds of meetings that my loan had been 
with Prudential Federal. 
At any rate, it's a fact, and it was something 
that I never tried to hide or have hid from anyone. 
So there's no sense of covering up. I guess if that 
creates error, it creates error. But so be it. I 
have a recollection that I did expose it, and whether 
you were there or Mr. Lewis or anyone else, I don't 
know. I did make the disclosure early on. 
MR. DEBRY: I do recall some conversations, I 
think, off the record, of that effect, and I honestly 
don't recall who was present. But it was a comment 
that was made from time to time. 
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MR. PALMER: Could I inquire of the Court when 
the loan was paid off? 
THE COURT: Probably two years ago. I'm not sure 
at what point in the discussions I indicated that, but 
I'm sure that in the presence of the collective group 
that I indicated that I had been a borrower of 
Prudential Federal Savings. 
MR. PALMER: No prejudice arose in the Court's 
mind because of the fact that we collected a mortgage 
escrow from you? 
THE COURT: No. 
MR. PALMER: Okay. I can't do anything else but 
ask. 
THE COURT: That's what I've been trying to tell 
you. That was the intention. 
MR. PALMER: I make the point because I didn't 
want to go on and let the Court note — 
THE COURT: I think I've made general comments 
throughout that I have cussed financial institutions, 
and customers do simply because they see inherent 
injustice about that. Any my perspective today, after 
23 years has passed, has become much, much different 
at the end of the 23 years. Far before that I could 
see the cost of money was markedly greater, and that I 
would be a damn fool to prepay. So I paid faithfully 
every month for 25 years, and not a day sooner or a 
day later. And I'm iust commenting generally in terms 
of uniust or whatever. The tension is between that to 
be gained and that to be lost, I suppose, in my eyes. 
And I have a feeling that class actions are a form of 
champerty in fsicl maintenance in that the one that 
substantially gains is the lawyer or the expert. Mr. 
Madsen stands to gain little, except he has struck a 
blow for freedom, I suppose, in the form that the 
consumer has achieved balance. 
Be seated, Mr. DeBrv. 
MR. DeBRY: I want to make an objection on the 
record. I really must. 
THE COURT: Well, sit down. 
MR. DeBRY: Before you give your decision, I must 
make a comment, because I know the Court is being 
candid and this has been a long struggle, and 
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Prudential says they are almost broke before this. 
Any you say maybe DeBry will make some money, but I 
haven't yet. But I really must interpose an objection 
at this point. If the Court harbors this type of 
personal bias with respect to — 
THE COURT: I'm just 
MR. DeBRY: — class actions. 
THE COURT: I'm just telling you about the 
tension. 
MR. DeBRY: I must object to the Court's sitting 
on this case if you have that kind of bias. 
THE COURT: I'm just telling you why I'm getting 
to my ruling and how I'm getting to my ruling and 
being open and candid with both of you. . . . 
Sit down, Mr. DeBry. 
MR. DeBRY: Your Honor — 
THE COURT: You can take exceptions after I get 
done. I'm trying to — 
MR. DeBRY: I might note that I do have an 
exception to take at this time before you give your 
verdict in this matter. 
THE COURT: I haven't given a verdict. 
(Emphasis added.) A transcript of the post-trial hearing is 
attached as Addendum A. The complete transcript of the entire 
trial appears at R. 278-600; 613-801. 
That was the first time Prudential's counsel, Mr. 
Palmer and Mr. Lewis, heard (i) Judge Rigtrup had been a 
borrower and mortgagor with Prudential for twenty five years; 
(ii) he had paid budget payments to Prudential; (iii) he had 
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"cussed financial institutions" concerning mortgage escrows, 
and he said customers do that, in his opinion, because they see 
"inherent injustice about [mortgage escrows]"; and (iv) he 
believes "class actions are a form of champerty in [sic] 
maintenance in that the one that substantially gains is the 
lawyer or the expert." (R. 117-119; 141.) 
Following the court proceedings on September 6th, 
1985, Mr. Palmer talked personally with each of the attorneys 
participating in the other interest-on-reserve actions: Peter 
W. Billings, Sr., Edward J. McDonough, Richard W. Giauque, and 
John P. Ashton. They were the attorneys whom Judge Rigtrup had 
identified as those who might have attended with him a meeting 
in which he believed he disclosed his mortgage relationship 
with Prudential. He also spoke with Prudential's President, 
Gene Donovan. The attorneys told Mr. Palmer they could not 
remember such a meeting, and they and Mr. Donovan told him they 
had never been told by anyone that Judge Rigtrup had a mortgage 
with Prudential. (R. 118; 133-134; 137-138; 149-150.) 
(iii) Disqualification Proceedings. 
On October 15, 1985, Prudential filed a Motion for 
Disqualification of Judge Rigtrup under Rule 63(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 99-100.) It was accompanied by 
six supporting affidavits and the required Certificate of 
Counsel, reflecting the motion was filed in good faith. (R. 
111-151.) The motion was assigned to the Honorable Philip R. 
Fishier, then the presiding judge. Judge Fishier held several 
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hearings on the motion (November 8 and 22, 1985; December 27, 
1985; February 21, 1985; and March 24, 1986). (R. 802-873; 
254-277.) In those hearings Judge Fishier took live testimony; 
he read the relevant portions of the trial transcript; and he 
reviewed the affidavits and numerous memoranda submitted by the 
parties. On January 16, 1986, Judge Fishier issued a 
Memorandum Decision (attached as Addendum B) in which he ruled 
Prudential's affidavits of disqualification were "legally 
sufficient" under Rule 63(b). He concluded (i) Prudential had 
objected and filed timely the Motion for Disqualification; (ii) 
the impartiality of Judge Rigtrup reasonably might have been 
questioned; (iii) Judge Rigtrup may have an undisclosed 
financial interest which could have been substantially affected 
by the outcome of the trial, within the meaning of Cannon 
3(C)(1)(c) of the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct; (iv) Judge 
Rigtrup should have disqualified himself; and, (v) no remittal 
of Judge Rigtrup1s disqualification was made by the parties and 
their counsel. (R. 238-243.) For these reasons, Judge Fishier 
disqualified Judge Rigtrup and, because he was disqualified 
before entering findings of fact, conclusions of law, or the 
judgment and no other judge could make and enter them, Judge 
Rigtrup's pre-trial rulings were vacated and the action was 
assigned to another judge for retrial. (R. 238-243.) Judge 
Fishier signed the Order disqualifying Judge Rigtrup on March 
24, 1986 (attached as Addendum C). 
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ARGUMENT 
Summary of Argument 
Judge Rigtrup, similar to the Madsens and the members 
of the plaintiff class, was a borrower of Prudential and was 
required to pay "budget payments." He has a potential claim 
against Prudential for any profits earned on the use of his 
payments. Therefore, he has a financial interest in the 
outcome of this proceeding, in violation of Canon 3(C) of the 
Utah Code of Judicial Conduct. 
Judge Rigtrup's financial interest, coupled with his 
failure to disclose it before trial; his unjudicious remarks at 
the close of trial; his personal knowledge of disputed 
evidentiary facts; — all created the "appearance of bias." 
His disqualification was required by both the Code of Judicial 
Conduct and Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Prudential timely filed a Motion for Disqualification, 
along with six supporting affidavits. Judge Fishier correctly 
ruled Prudential's affidavits were "legally sufficient" within 
the meaning of Rule 63(b) and provided an ample basis for the 
disqualification of Judge Rigtrup. The Madsens failed to show 
Judge Rigtrup had disclosed to the parties his prior 
relationship as a Prudential borrower. 
Once disqualified, Judge Rigtrup could not continue to 
preside over this action. Moreover, his prior orders and 
decisions, tainted by his prejudice and financial interest, 
were voided. The action was assigned to another judge for 
retrial. 
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I. Judge Rigtrup's Disqualification Was Not An Abuse of the 
Trial Court's Discretion, 
The "legal sufficiency" of the affidavits of 
disqualification is determined by a judge other than the one 
sought to be disqualified. See Utah R. Civ. P. 63(b); State v. 
Poteet, 692 P.2d 760, 762 (Utah 1984). He decides the issue as 
he does any other matter. Haslam v. Morrison, 113 Utah 14, 190 
P.2d 520, 523 (1948). It is addressed to his sound discretion 
and, unless clear abuse of that discretion is shown, the ruling 
will not be reversed on appeal. See Peatross v. Board of 
Commissioners, 555 P.2d 281, 284 (Utah 1976). Judge Fishier 
carefully considered the issue of disqualification, ultimately 
ruling Prudential's affidavits were sufficient to remove Judge 
Rigtrup. The decision was not an abuse of the court's 
discretion and should be affirmed. 
II. Judge Rigtrup Has A Financial Interest in the Outcome of 
This Action Which Required His Disqualification. 
Judge Rigtrup had a mortgage with Prudential which 
required budget payments. Thus, he is a potential member of a 
class which may have claims against Prudential for interest on 
reserve funds. Judge Fishier found the outcome of this trial 
would substantially affect Judge Rigtrup's financial interest 
in future claims against Prudential for interest. Judge 
Fishier wrote in his Memorandum Decision: 
It is disputed as to whether or not Judge Rigtrup 
would be a member of a potential class of individuals 
who may or may not have causes of action against 
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Prudential, Although Judge Rigtrup is not a party to 
this litigation, it is conceivable that his rulings 
could be binding upon Prudential in other similar 
litigation in which Judge Rigtrup could be a plaintiff 
on a theory of collateral estoppel. He may therefore 
have a financial interest which would be substantially 
affected by the outcome of the proceeding as defined 
under Canon 3(C)(1)(c). 
(R. 240-241.) 
The Madsens disagree with Judge Fishier*s finding. 
They contend (Point I, their brief at 3-6) Judge Rigtrup does 
not have any financial interest which could have been affected 
by this trial. They reach that conclusion with three arguments. 
A. Judge Rigtrup is a "Potential" Member of the Existing 
Plaintiff Class. 
First, they contend Judge Rigtrup is not a member of 
the existing plaintiff class. They claim the class 
conditionally certified by Judge Croft includes only those 
borrowers whose trust deeds contain pledge language (i.e, where 
the reserve funds are pledged as additional security for loan 
repayment). Their argument is disarmingly simple, but wrong. 
Judge Rigtrup is a "potential" member of the existing class 
because the boundaries of the class are not set. 
The frailty of the Madsens* argument is readily seen 
after a review of the amendments they have made to their 
complaint. They originally alleged a class action only of 
Prudential borrowers against Prudential, as the sole defendant, 
seeking past interest on the budget payments. It was that 
complaint which was before this Court in Madsen v. Prudential 
Federal Savings & Loan Assn., 558 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1977) and 
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which Judge Bryant Croft used on July 13, 1977, to certify 
conditionally a plaintiff class composed of all persons having 
trust deeds with Prudential which provide exactly as the 
2 
Madsens1 trust deed. (R. 2-7; 39-40.) 
The Madsens frequently amended the complaint, each 
time altering the class allegations and adding new claims. (R. 
52-58; 41-51.) On October 14, 1981, the Madsens filed yet 
another complaint, their Substitute Third Amended Complaint. 
It is the current complaint. (R. 59-86.) It alleges an 
enlarged plaintiff class of all Utah borrowers against a 
defendant class of all Utah mortgage lenders who use trust 
deeds with language "similar" to the Madsens. It seeks an 
accounting and all profits to be earned in the future from use 
of the budget payments. In addition, it asserts that 
Prudential conspired with other Utah lenders to mislead 
borrowers into relinquishing their potential rights in this 
3 
action, and that the "Interest on Mortgage Loan Reserve 
2
 The plaintiff class certification was conditioned on the 
Madsens first establishing their own right to recover. 
(R. 39-40.) 
3
 Effective June 30, 1979, Prudential had terminated the 
requirement for budget payments on all of its real estate 
loans, including the Madsens', except those loans where federal 
or quasi-federal insurers or guarantors refused to waive the 
requirement. This was done to coincide with a then new Utah 
Act ("Interest on Mortgage Loan Reserve Accounts" Act, Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 7-17-1 to -10 (1982)) which had become effective 
July 1, 1979. The Act authorized Utah lending institutions 
these options: (1) to discontinue the reserve account 
requirement and permit their borrowers to pay the taxes and 
Footnote continued next page. 
-14-
Accounts" Act (Utah Code Ann. §§ 7-17-1 to -10 (1982)) violates 
the United States Constitution by allowing lenders to forego 
4 
the maintenance of reserve accounts. The Madsens seek 
compensatory damages, punitive damages, and injunctive relief. 
Judge Croft's class certification order was made 
before the Madsens filed their Substitute Third Amended 
Complaint in October, 1981. (R. 39-40.) That complaint vastly 
expanded their legal theories and expanded the alleged 
plaintiff class from Prudential's borrowers to all mortgagors 
in Utah whose trust deeds "provide in substance and effect" 
what the Madsens' provides. The Madsens admit in their Appeal 
Brief (at 4) that their amended complaint " . . . added new 
theories and sought to enlarge the class." 
Footnote 3 continued from previous page. 
insurance premiums directly; (2) to permit the borrowers to 
maintain accounts and make the payments as before, but neither 
pay interest on the funds in the accounts nor charge the 
borrowers administrative cost for the service; or, (3) to 
require reserve accounts in which case the lender must pay 
interest on the accumulated funds but not charge the borrower 
any administrative cost. In accordance with the Act, 
Prudential, as did other lending institutions, notified its 
borrowers that it would no longer require budget payments. The 
form of Prudential's notice conformed to the requirements of 
the Act. The Madsens' Substitute Third Amended Complaint (1f1f 
25-32) alleges the notices were part of a conspiracy among 
lenders to mislead borrowers into relinquishing their potential 
rights in this action. 
4
 The Madsens contend (1f1f 33-43) they have a vested right 
at common law to receive "earnings" or "profits" from 
Prudential's use of their budget payments and that the lending 
institutions, acting under the authority of the Act, could not 
take their common law right by eliminating the reserve accounts. 
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The Madsens1 machinations with the class allegations 
of their complaints have produced for them a dilemma. They 
abandoned the smaller, original class. Judge Alden J. Anderson 
first noticed the problem. In April, 1979, (after this action 
had been removed to the United States District Court) he denied 
the Madsens1 first motion for notice to class members, writing: 
The court is persuaded that no class 
certification is now in effect. The certification 
order entered by the State Court [Judge Croft] was 
nullified by the amendment of Madsens1 complaint to 
allege a vastly broader class of plaintiffs.5 
(Addendum F.) 
In addition, the machinations have left behind a 
plaintiff class whose boundaries are not precise. The 
plaintiff class is no longer defined to include only those 
whose mortgages specify the funds are "pledged." For example, 
the Substitute Third Amended Complaint (1f 4(e)) defines reserve 
account to mean " . . . any account (whether denominated.escrow, 
impound, trust, pledge, reserve or otherwise) . . . whereby the 
borrower agrees to make periodic prepayment to the lender . . . 
of taxes, insurance premiums, or other charges . . . ." Judge 
Rigtrup's mortgage provides the funds are held "in trust" and 
so it is within that definition. (Addendum G.) Paragraph 8(e) 
5
 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently held the 
United States District Court lacked federal question 
jurisdiction and ordered the action remanded to the state 
court. Madsen v. Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Assn., 635 
F.2d 797 (10th Cir. 1980). 
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of that complaint pleads that a common issue of law and fact is 
"whether the real estate loan constitutes a contract of 
adhesion," yet paragraph 4(a) defines such a loan as "any" 
loan, not just those with "pledge" in them. Judge Rigtrup's 
mortgage is within that claim. Paragraph 24 of the complaint 
alleges Prudential owes the Madsens an accounting for profits 
"earned from the use of the 'budget1 funds". Judge Rigtrup's 
mortgage falls within that claim, too. 
The complaint in Read v. American Equity and the 
amended complaint in Dixon v. United Savings, two of the other 
four interest-on-reserves cases pending and assigned to Judge 
Rigtrup, are virtually idential to the Madsens* complaint 
here. (Addenda H and I.) That is not surprising, given each 
case has the same plaintiffs' counsel. In Read and Dixon, the 
complaints plead the reserve funds are held "in trust," not 
"pledged," even though their mortgage language is virtually 
identical to Judge Rigtrup's, and the same plaintiff and 
defendant class allegations are made as in Madsen. Both 
complaints pray for accountings of all profits earned by the 
defendant class members (all mortgage banking institutions in 
Utah, in Read; all state chartered banks and savings and loan 
associations, in Dixon). In both cases, the claim* ±4r that the 
defendants hold reserve funds in trust and, therefore, they 
ought to pay-over all profits earned. In August-September, 
1984, the plaintiffs in all three cases filed motions to 
consolidate Read and Dixon with this case on the basis each has 
"similar or identical issues of fact or law." (Addenda J and 
K.) 
The Madsens continued the confusion at trial before 
Judge Rigtrup. In their trial brief (dated August 30, 1985), 
they wrote: 
Several citations refer to trust relationships. 
However, the very nature of the pledge transaction 
gives rise to a trust relationship between the pledgor 
and the pledgor . . . . Utah law applies various trust 
principles to pledge cases. 
fn. 7 at 11 (Citations omitted.) Moreover, they relied heavily 
on Derenco, Inc. v. Benjamin Franklin Federal Savings & Loan 
Assn., 281 Or. 553, 577 P.2d 477 (1978), the only appellate 
case ever to allow borrowers to recover in an 
interest-on-reserve case. The Madsens* trial brief (at 13) 
said "the facts and legal theories in Derenco are nearly 
identical to Madsen . . . " They quoted extensively from it. 
Derenco's theory is simply one of unjust enrichment (at 491), 
not "trust" or "pledge" language and the Madsens have not 
disclaimed the Derenco theory. Judge Rigtrup's mortgage 
clearly comes within the Derenco case. 
Had the Madsens ever disclaimed Derenco and all other 
theories of recovery except "pledge" before Judge Rigtrup 
ruled, they might be able to contend he is not a class member. 
They did not, and so they cannot say Judge Rigtrup is not at 
least a potential class member on the other causes of action 
pleaded in their complaint. Either Judge Rigtrup is a 
potential member of the class or there is the appearance he 
is. Either way, his disqualification is required. 
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B. Judge Rigtrup Is A "Potential" Member of An Alleged, 
Larger Plaintiff Class. 
The Madsens next contend Judge Rigtrup denied 
certification of an enlarged plaintiff class which, they admit 
(their brief at 5), would have included him. Thus, they claim 
he ruled against his own interest in this case, demonstrating 
his impartiality. 
Except for their conclusion, the Madsens* argument is 
correct. The Substitute Third Amended Complaint does allege 
(If 5) a plaintiff class of all mortgagors in the State of Utah 
whose trust deed language is similar "in substance and effect" 
to the Madsens*. That necessarily includes all of Prudential's 
borrowers, including Judge Rigtrup. Thus, Judge Rigtrup falls 
within the plaintiff class pleaded in the Madsens* existing 
complaint. The Madsens unabashedly admit (their brief at 5) 
Judge Rigtrup falls within the alleged class: "If the new 
class had been certified, Judge Rigtrup would have become a 
member of that new class." They made the same admission in 
the February, 1986 hearing before Judge Fishier: 
Now, it is true that Judge Rigtrup might have a 
potential interest in — he might — there may be a 
financial interest to Judge Rigtrup growing out of 
this case . . . If the court will recall, there was a 
very narrow class of people that had a particular kind 
of contract exactly- »like Madsen's [sic], a-nd Judge 
Rigtrup's contract, wasn't .like Madsen's [sic]. It was 
different so JudgB Rigtrup is not a member of that 
class. . . . 
6
 The admission appears in the main text of their appeal 
brief (at 5). They made a similar statement in footnote 4, at 
5: " . . . The new enlarged plaintiff class would (if 
certified) have included Judge Rigtrup." 
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But there was a claim to enlarge the class, and 
the claim to enlarge the class would basically include 
every customer of Prudential, so Judge Rigtrup may 
have had an interest in this case. . . . 
(R. 257.) Everyone agrees Judge Rigtrup is a potential member 
of the alleged enlarged plaintiff class. And therein lies the 
problem: If the enlarged plaintiff class is certified, its 
members, including Judge Rigtrup, will surely claim damages 
from Prudential on the strength of the findings of fact, legal 
conclusions and judgment which Judge Rigtrup was prepared to 
enter in this action. 
One additional point. The Madsens want this Court to 
believe Judge Rigtrup denied certification of the enlarged 
plaintiff class alleged in the Substitute Third Amended 
Complaint. Not so. What he denied was the Madsens1 motion to 
certify the alleged defendant class of banks, and he made the 
denial without prejudice to renew the motion. (R. 90-91.) 
Thus, Judge Rigtrup neither has precluded certification of the 
class in which he clearly falls nor has he, as the Madsens 
claim, ruled against his own financial interest in the outcome 
of this action. 
C. Judge Rigtrup Can File An Individual Action Against 
Prudential If The Madsens Prevail On Their Claim That 
The "Interest On Mortgage Loan Reserve Accounts" Act 
Is Unconstitutional. 
The Madsens contend Judge Rigtrup is not a member of 
the existing plaintiff class nor of the the enlarged plaintiff 
class. In their third argument, they contend (their brief at 
6) the statute of limitations in the "Interest on Mortgage Loan 
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Reserve Accounts" Act now bars him from filing a purely 
individual action against Prudential. 
Prudential agrees. Section 7-17-9(2) Utah Code Ann. 
(1982) reads: 
No action seeking payment of interest on or other 
compensation for the use of funds in any reserve 
account for any period prior to July 1, 1979, shall be 
brought after June 30, 1981. . . . 
A purely personal action is now time barred. It is worth 
noting, however, that the Madsens allege in their Substitute 
Third Amended Complaint (1f1f 33-43) the Act is 
unconstitutional. If unconstitutional, Judge Rigtrup1s 
personal claim remains. 
Ill. Judge Riatrup Violated the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct 
Which Required His Disqualification. 
Judge Fishier concluded: 
" . . . that the impartiality of Judge Rigtrup 
might be reasonably questioned, and therefore Judge 
Rigtrup should have disqualified himself from hearing 
the issues raised in this case." 
(R. 240.) The Madsens do not challenge the finding of 
appearance of partiality. Rather, they claim (Point II, their 
brief at 7) an "appearance of bias" is not a ground for 
disqualification under Rule 63. "Appearance of bias" is a 
violation of the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct, but they 
contend the Code neither is germaine to the disqualification of 
a judge (Point IV, their brief at 10-11) nor, even if deemed 
relevant, was it violated by Judge Rigtrup (Point III, their 
brief at 8-10). 
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The Madsens' argument is not correct. The appearance 
of bias dictates disqualification under both Rule 63 and the 
Code of Judicial Conduct. 
A. "Appearance of Bias" Is Ground For Disqualification. 
Rule 63 and Canon 3(C)(1) require disqualification 
when the impartiality of a judge reasonably can be questioned. 
Actual bias simply is not the sole standard. 
1. Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Disqualifies A Judge for the "Appearance of Bias." 
Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides for disqualification of any judge against whom is 
filed a "legally sufficient" affidavit stating the " . . . facts 
and the reasons for the belief that such bias or prejudice 
7 
exists. . . ." . The truth or falsity of the facts stated in 
the affidavit is not questioned. Rather, the only issue under 
Rule 63(b) is whether those facts, taken as true, are "legally 
sufficient" to draw the reasonable inference that the judge is 
biased. See Jacobson v. District Court, 674 P.2d, 952, 955-956 
(Colo. 1984). The Rule reads, in part: 
7
 There are, in addition, two statutes which bear on 
disqualification. Article VIII, § 13 of the Utah Constitution 
and Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-1 (1953) provide for the 
disqualification of a judge when he is a party or is interested 
in the action, when he is related to the parties, when he has 
previously acted as counsel for either party, or when he has 
previously presided over the action. 
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Whenever a party to any action or proceeding, civil or 
criminal, or his attorney shall make and file an 
affidavit that the judge before whom such action or 
proceeding is to be tried or heard has a bias or 
prejudice, either against such party or his attorney 
or in favor of any opposite party to the suit, such 
judge shall proceed no further therein, except to call 
in another judge to hear and determine the matter. 
8 
• • • • 
The bias or prejudice may take either of two forms. It may be 
actual bias or prejudice on the part of a judge which 
disqualifies him. Haslam v. Morrison, 113 Utah 14, 190 P.2d 
520, 523 (1948). Or, there may be circumstances where the 
judge's conduct or his comments give the appearance of bias or 
prejudice, in which case it is his duty to disqualify, 
notwithstanding that he personally believes himself to 
9 
befair. The latter principle was explained at length by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Haslam. Justice Wolfe wrote: 
8
 The remainder of paragraph (b), omitted here, describes 
the procedural steps for a disqualification proceeding. Rule 
63(b) is set forth in its entirety in Addendum D. 
9
 This is similar to the federal test for 
disqualification: Whether a reasonable man, knowing all the 
circumstances, might question the judge's impartiality. See 28 
U.S.C. § 455(a); United States v. Giqax, 605 F.2d 507 (10th 
Cir. 1979); United States v. Ritter, 540 F.2d 459 (10th Cir. 
1976), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 951 (1976). The standard is also 
widely accepted among state courts. See, for example, the 
following: 
California: Solberg v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. Rptr. 460, 
561 P.2d 1148 (1977), construing disqualification 
statute; 
Colorado: People v. District Court, 192 Colo. 503, 560 
P.2d 828 (1977); 
Footnote continued next page. 
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The general practice in this jurisdiction has 
been for judges to disqualify themselves whenever an 
affidavit of bias and prejudice against them has been 
filed. As a general rule, we think this is a 
commendable practice. The purity and integrity of the 
judicial process ought to be protected against any 
taint of suspicion to the end that the public and 
litigants may have the highest confidence in the 
integrity and fairness of the courts. This is not to 
say that the mere filing of an affidavit of bias and 
prejudice, ipso facto casts such suspicion on the 
judge, and upon his integtiry and fairness, that he 
ought to disqualify himself. However, it is 
ordinarily better for a judge to disqualify himself 
even though he may be entirely free of bias and 
prejudice if either litigant files an affidavit of 
bias and prejudice. 'Next in importance to the duty 
of rendering a righteous judgment is that of doing it 
in such a manner as will beget no suspicion of the 
fairness or integrity of the judge.• . . . 
Moreover, if the judge concludes that the affiant 
is sincere in his belief that he, the judge is biased 
against him, it ordinarily is well for such judge not 
to try the case for the very reason that he may 
unconsciously lean toward such litigant to demonstrate 
that he is not biased toward him. And unless the 
judge is entirely insensitive to criticism and a 
revealed state of a litigant's mind, he may be 
rendering his judgment from a mind not entirely free 
from emotion. 
190 P.2d at 523-24. (Citations omitted.) The concurring 
opinion of Justice Wade added these explanatory comments: 
Footnote 9 continued from previous page. 
New Mexico: State ex rel. Anaya v. Scarborough, 75 N.M. 
702, 410 P.2d 732 (1966); 
Oklahoma: Merritt v. Hunter, 575 P.2d 623 (Okl. 1978); 
Washington: Chicago, Mil., St. P. & Pac. R.R. Co. v. 
Washington State Human Rights Commission, 87 Wash. 2d 
802, 557 P.2d 307 (1976); State v. Romano, 36 Wash. 
App. 567, 662 P.2d 406 (1983); State v. Madrv, 8 Wash. 
App. 61, 504 P.2d 1156 (1972). 
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If the judge is not biased and prejudiced, there 
does not seem to be any good reason why, if a litigant 
in his court believes he is, that he should not get 
another judge to try the case since the result of the 
litigation should be the same in both cases. In this 
state, a change of judge in a particular case can be 
readily arranged without inconvenience either to the 
court or the litigants. If he is biased and 
prejudiced he will be tempted to hold falsely that he 
is not, and refuse to get another judge so that he can 
vent his spleen on the litigant against whom he is 
prejudiced. That a judge should never have the 
opportunity to refuse to get another judge because he 
wishes to get his revenge against a litigant in his 
court is certainly a result to be devoutly wished 
for. Even though the judge is entirely free from bias 
and prejudice where he refuses to make the change the 
party making the application therefor will very likely 
always believe that in making such ruling he had 
ulterior motives. 
One of the most important things in government is 
that all persons subject to its jurisdiction shall 
always be able to obtain a fair and impartial trial in 
all matters of litigation in its courts. It is nearly 
as important that the people have absolute confidence 
in the integrity of the courts. I can think of 
nothing that would as surely bring the courts into 
disrepute as for a judge to insist on trying a case 
where one of the litigants believes that such judge is 
biased and prejudiced against him. . . I therefore 
believe that in such a case it would be very desirable 
for the judge to disqualify himself whether he was in 
fact biased and prejudiced against such party or not. 
This is true also for the reasons pointed out in the 
prevailing opinion that where the judge knows that one 
of the parties does not have confidence in his 
fairness he will be apt to either be unfair to the 
opposing party in an effort to demonstrate his 
fairness to the party complaining or he will resent 
the accusation and for that reason be unable to treat 
both parties fairly. 
Few cases have come to the attention of this 
court where a district judge has refused to make a 
transfer upon application of a litigant. That is due 
largely to what I think is an almost universal 
practice in this state for district judges to get 
another judge even on the mere suggestion of a party 
to a litigation that the judge was biased or 
prejudiced. This I consider a highly desirable 
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practice and I believe that such a practice has a very 
strong tendency to forestall and prevent any desire on 
the part of litigants to ask for a change of judge in 
bad faith. 
190 P.2d at 526. See also State v. Bvington, 114 Utah 388, 200 
P.2d 723, 726 (1948) . 
2. Canon 3(C)(1) of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Conduct Disqualifies A Judge for the "Appearance 
of Bias." 
The Court's admonitions in Haslam find expression in 
the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct. Six of its seven canons 
counsel judges to avoid the appearance of partiality in all of 
their affairs, both personal and public. One of those 
canons, Canon 3(C)(1), applies squarely to this case: "A judge 
should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned . . . ." 
10
 Canon 1 first notes that "An independent and honorable 
judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society" and then 
commands judges to preserve the judiciary's integrity and 
independence by observing high standards of conduct. Canon 2 
is even more direct: "A Judge Should Avoid Impropriety and the 
Appearance of Impropriety in All His Activities." Canon 4 
permits a judge to pursue quasi-judicial activities, provided 
". . .he does not cast doubt on his capacity to decide 
impartially any issue that may come before him. . . . " Canon 5 
permits a judge to participate in those civic and charitable 
activities which ". . .do not reflect adversely upon his 
impartiality. . . . " Canon 6 permits receipt of compensation 
by a judge for his quasi and extra-judicial activities ".. - . 
if the source of such payments does not give the appearance of 
influencing the judge in his judicial duties or otherwise give 
the appearance of impropriety. . . . " 
The Utah Code of Judicial Conduct appears in Addendum E. 
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Impartiality may be questioned by virtue of the judge's conduct 
or remarks, or by virtue of his knowledge of disputed 
evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding (under Canon 
3(C)(1)(a)), or by virtue of his financial interest in the 
outcome of the proceeding (under Canon 3(C)(1)(c)). A judge 
faced with disqualification may continue to sit only after 
meeting the conditions of remittal set forth in Canon 3(D): 
A judge may instead of withdrawing from the 
proceeding, disclose on the record the basis of his 
disqualification. If, based on such disclosure, the 
parties and lawyers, independently of the judge's 
participation, all agree that the judge's relationship 
is immaterial or that his financial interest is 
insubstantial, the judge is no longer disqualfied, and 
may participate in the proceeding. 
Once thought applicable only in impeachment or 
disciplinary proceedings, Codes of Judicial Conduct, similar to 
Utah's, now are used in disqualification proceedings, too. In 
fact, ten states in the Pacific region explicitly or implicitly 
recognize their respective Codes of Judicial Conduct constitute 
12 
an independent basis for disqualification of judges. 
1 1
 See generally, Leslie W. Abramson, Judicial 
Disqualification Under Canon 3C of the Code of Judicial Conduct 
(1986) . 
1 2
 See e.g., State v. Valencia, 124 Ariz. 139, 602 P.2d 807 
(1979); Smith v. Beckman," 683 P.2d 1214 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984); 
State v. Meafou, 677 P.2d 459 (Hawaii 1984); Yorita v. Okumoto, 
643 P.2d 820 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1982); State v. Logan, 689 P.2d 
778 (Kan. 1984); United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 96 
N.M. 155, 629 P.2d 231 (1980); Ham v. Eighth Judicial District 
Court, 566 P.2d 420 (Nev. 1977); Nauni v. Cannon, 628 P.2d 372 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1981); State v. Meyer, 45 Or. App. 375, 608 
P.2d 582 (1980); Turngren v. King County, 649 P.2d 153 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1982); Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79 (Wyo. 1981). 
Footnote continued next page. 
B. Judge Rigtrup Has A Financial Interest in the Outcome 
of This Proceeding Within the Meaning of Canon 3(C) of 
the Utah Code Of Judicial Conduct. 
The Madsens contend Judge Rigtrup does not have, 
within the meaning of Canon 3(C)(1)(c), a . . . "financial 
interest in the subject matter in controversy • • • that could 
be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding." 
Not true. Canon (3(C)(3)(c)) defines "financial interest" to 
include, among other items, ". . .a legal or equitable 
interest, however small." [Emphasis added.] Canon 3(C)(2) 
then places the responsibility upon the judge to determine when 
the interest exists: "A judge should inform himself about his 
personal and fiduciary financial interests. . .." These 
sections apply to Judge Rigtrup: he knew of his debtor 
relationship with Prudential; it made him a potential member of 
the alleged enlarged plaintiff class; and he stood to gain 
financially by the outcome of this action. 
The Madsens contend Judge Rigtrup only has a 
contingent, speculative interest in this case, equivalent to 
what the Madsens personally stand to gain: $134. Such an 
interest hardly merits disqualification, they claim. 
Footnote 12 continued from previous page, 
This is the rule in other geographic locations as well. 
See e.g., Timm v. Timm, 195 Conn. 202, 487 A.2d 191 (1985); 
Stephens v. Stephens, 249 Ga. 700, 292 S.E.2d 689 (1982). 
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The precise dollar amount of Judge Rigtrup*s interest 
is not important for three reasons. First, the issue is 
whether the mere presence of any interest gives him the 
appearance of bias. Second, it is the budget payment practice 
itself, not solely the dollar amount of recovery, which creates 
the attitude of bias in some, including the Madsens and 
apparently Judge Rigtrup. Remember, he said he had "cussed 
financial institutions" and he said customers do that simply 
because they see "inherent injustice about [the reserve payment 
practice]." (R. 786.) Third, the $134 recovery cannot be 
considered too small for it is, after all, what prompted and 
what fuels the Madsens' pursuit of this action. 
The Madsens rely (their brief at 9-10) exclusively on 
Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. , 89 L.Ed.2d 
823 (1986). The case supports Prudential on several issues: 
it violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
". . .to subject (a person's) liberty or property to the 
judgment of a court the judge of which has a direct, personal, 
substantial, pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion 
against him in his case; and, having disqualified the judge, 
his decisions are retroactively vacated to serve the 
"appearance of justice." Id. at 832-833, 837. Prudential 
raises similar issues here. It is sufficient to note Judge 
Rigtrup was a Prudential borrower who paid budget payments, and 
he knew it; he is a potential member either of the existing 
plaintiff class or of the alleged larger class, with a 
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pecuniary interest identical to every putative class member, 
including the Madsens, and he knew that; and, he presided over 
the trial without first disclosing his interest, and without 
obtaining remittal of the grounds. 
The Madsens cite Lavoie only because it refused 
disqualification of the other justices of the Alabama Court, 
besides Judge Embry, on account of their "slight pecuniary 
interest." That reliance on the case is misplaced. The 
Supreme Court refused to require their recusal because the 
record did not suggest they had any knowledge of Judge Embry1s 
class action (of which they could have been members) before the 
court issued its opinion. That is not this case. Judge 
Rugtrup had full knowledge of his interest and did not disclose 
it. 
One final comment. The Supreme Court was concerned 
with only one question: under what circumstances does the 
Federal Constitution require judicial disqualification. The 
Court made efforts to note the scope of its holding: 
The Due Process Clause demarks only the outer 
boundaries of judicial disqualification. Congress and 
the States, of course, remain free to impose more 
rigorous standards for judicial disqualification than 
those we find mandated here today. 
89 L.Ed.2d at 837. In Utah, Rule 63 and the Code erf Judicial 
Conduct do impose a more rigorous standard. 
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C. Judge Rigtrup Has Personal Knowledge of Disputed 
Evidentiary Facts Within the Meaning of Canon 3(C) of 
the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct. 
The Madsens have overlooked one other disqualifying 
consideration which Judge Fishier considered. Canon 3(C)(1)(a) 
also requires disqualification if the judge has ". . . personal 
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the 
proceeding. ..." Judge Rigtrup has such knowledge. 
In its answer to the Substitute Third Amended 
Complaint, Prudential contended, among other defenses, that in 
some instances budget payments were required by federal or 
quasi-federal agencies which regulated Prudential or which 
operated in the secondary mortgage market. (Addendum L, 1[ 36 
at 4; If 54 at 8.) Judge Rigtrup ruled in September, 1985, 
however, that the only issue for trial was whether Prudential 
earned a net profit on the Madsens1 payments. (R. 93-94.) All 
other issues and affirmative defenses were excluded from trial, 
including any evidence of why Prudential collected the reserve 
funds. 
At trial, Prudential claimed and offered evidence that 
the budget payments made by the Madsens were so small that the 
expense of handling them exceeded any earnings which were 
made. Prudential then attempted to show that it was required 
to have its borrowers make budget payments notwithstanding the 
losses: 
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MR. PALMER: Ojection to this for another reason, 
your Honor. This question is going to the benefit of 
the loans and the benefit of escrow on loans, why the 
escrow was required. 
We tried our hardest to put on evidence that the 
secondary market required these escrows and that's the 
reason the provision was there. And the Court has 
felt it necessary to follow the mandate, as it views 
it from the Supreme Court, that the only issue is to 
account. And so now we are going right back into the 
same issue. 
Why do we have these escrows? Why would 
Prudential lose money on these escrows? 
(R. 526.) And, once again: 
MR. PALMER: Now, your Honor, I don't have any 
further witnesses to call, and subject to an offer of 
proof, and I make the offer of proof because we 
contend that there are a number of additional issues 
in the case beyond the question of profit. 
I'd be glad to detail those issues. There are at 
least 24 of them. But to move those issues, we would 
offer the testimony that is contained in the affidavit 
of Edwin [sic] Calvert already in the file, the 
affidavit of Gibbs Marsh, already on file. Also, the 
evidence that is contained in Prudential's answers to 
interrogatories. We would offer Prudential's charter, 
in effect until 1977, called Charter K, which 
specifically says that Prudentail is not required to 
pay earnings on short-term deposits. 
We would offer the deposition of Arthur Libold, 
[sic] or the testimony as contained in the deposition 
of Mr. Libold [sic]. The deposition of Mr. Madsen, 
the documents filed by Mr. DeBry, by plaintiff, as 
produced by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, our 
annual reports, the briefs on appeal, and testimony 
from Mr. Adams, an auditor of Prudential Federal 
Savings. 
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. . . And in the interest of time I'll spare you 
argument as to what I contend those additional issues 
are. 
THE COURT: As you know, the Supreme Court in the 
case of Madsen v. Prudential concluded that the 
underlying loan agreement created a pledge, and if the 
pledged assets yielded a profit, that the defendant 
had an obligation to account therefor and allow the 
Madsens an offset at minimum against any amounts 
claimed due by them. 
And your position, with respect to industry 
practices, what was within the contemplation of the 
parties, federal law notwithstanding and be damned, 
and that's my reading of the decision of the Supreme 
Court, and it would be inappropriate to go into those 
issues. 
MR. PALMER: Thank you. And I take it the offer 
is — 
THE COURT: The offer for those reasons is noted 
and rejected. Well, the offer for the sake of the 
record and so forth is received as an offer and the 
record may so show. 
MR. PALMER: Thank you. We rest. 
THE COURT: But it's true that it would be an 
exercise in futility for you to call witnesses and 
produce evidence, because I have sustained the 
objection. . . . 
(R. 555-557.) 
Later, the Madsens wanted to introduce evidence 
tending to show Prudential had alternatives in the 1980's for 
handling the reserve accounts- Mr. Palmer objected. Judge 
Rigtrup sustained the objection on the basis that the evidence 
pertained to events outside the relevant time period and he 
replied to Mr. DeBry: "We're talking about Prudential 
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Federal's cost. If they had another way they could have done 
it cheaper, or whatever, I'll allow you to bring that in." (R. 
600.) The Madsens, however, offered no evidence whatever of 
"another way they could have done it" during the relevant 
accounting period, 1972 through June 1979. 
Judge Rigtrup disbelieved Prudential's claim of net 
loss in handling the funds. He ruled at trial's end that had 
Prudential been losing so much money as it claimed, it would 
have used cheaper, alternative methods to handle all reserves 
or it would have discontinued them altogether: 
. . . 
And it seems to me that if the conclusions that 
are followed by the cost accounting approach are 
followed, management would have failed a long time 
ago. The funds are and have been of benefit to 
Prudential Federal Savings & Loan over the years. 
They provide a base over which to spread costs. They 
provide a hedge against default, and provide security. 
I realize there are some federal regulations 
about that, though Prudential, as did other savings 
and loans, banks, and other institutions, followed the 
state statute in terms of turning that practice 
around. And as I recall, part of the regulation 
provided that state law could be [followed]. But if 
in the last years when costs, as you indicate, Mr. 
Norman, [Prudential's expert accountant] went up 
enormously — as they did — Prudential Federal, if it 
really strictly followed that analysis, would have 
somehow found a lower cost alternative rather than 
keep a loss leader. I give them more credit than that. 
It does not appear to be rational at all, as per 
Exhibit 8, that costs would escalate in that fashion 
and they would still maintain that function without 
making some big corrections. 
(R. 791-793.) 
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Whether Prudential was required to collect budget 
payments for taxes and insurance; whether other alternative 
handling methods were available; what they were; when they were 
available; whether they could be exercised on only small, 
unprofitable mortgages like the Madsens', or whether 
Prudential, as a mutual association, had to treat all budget 
accounts alike, regardless of size; whether the alternative 
methods could be exercised in the face of governmental 
regulation or secondary market considerations, — all of these 
issues became relevant and highly disputed in light of Judge 
Rigtrup's ruling. The answers were contained in Prudential's 
offer of proof. Judge Rigtrup had ordered, however, that no 
evidence was permitted to explain why Prudential collected the 
budget payments. 
Judge Rigtrup had personal knowledge outside the 
record about the various ways Prudential collected the budget 
payments and accounted for them to borrowers. He knew 
Prudential waived the budget payment requirement for insurance 
premiums on his loan in 1977. Judge Rigtrup did not pay any 
budget payments for insurance after February 1977. (R. 195.) 
In July 1979, Prudential sent most borrowers, including Judge 
Rigtrup and the Madsens, a letter giving borrowers the options 
to continue the accounts on a compensation-free basis, or to 
discontinue the accounts. (R. 192.) Judge Rigtrup took the 
first option. He paid-off his loan on December 14, 1983. 
(R. 195.) 
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Judge Rigtrup's experience as a Prudential borrower 
gave him independent knowledge, from outside the record, of the 
disputed issue of what alternatives were available, when, and 
in what instances. He clearly should be disqualified because 
he had ". . . personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts 
concerning the proceeding. . . ." He knew Prudential 
discontinued his insurance reserve in 1977 and he jumped to the 
conclusion in his ruling that Prudential could have and would 
have discontinued the Madsens* reserve, or otherwise changed 
its handling procedures, rather than lose money in requiring 
them. He jumped to that conclusion although he had excluded 
evidence offered by Prudential to explain why and when it 
collected reserves* He jumped to that conclusion without any 
evidence whatsoever that Prudential had other alternatives 
available. He said in his ruling he disbelieved Prudential's 
claim of net loss on the Madsens* reserve. It now is 
discovered that he could have relied on his own personal 
knowledge and experience with Prudential, outside the record, 
to reach his conclusion. The critical materiality of that 
knowledge is that it proves to be the only factual basis for 
his ruling, and that factual basis was his own knowledge, 
outside the record. 
D. Violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct Warrants 
Disqualification. 
The Madsens agree Judge Rigtrup should be disciplined 
if he violated an ethical Canon. They do not approve of his 
disqualification, however. They contend enforcement of the 
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Canon penalized them, not him, by requiring them to undergo the 
expense of a second trial. 
The Madsens' concern for additional litigation expense 
is not the most important issue. The overriding issue is more 
fundamental: a party's right to be tried fairly by a judiciary 
it believes is impartial, disinterested. The Code of Judicial 
Conduct safeguards that right by disqualifying those judges 
13 having even the appearance of partiality. 
Judge Rigtrup was assigned this case in 1984, only one 
year before trial. During that year he scheduled and saw the 
completion of discovery, heard competing motions for summary 
judgment, and conducted a three day trial. Given the 
completion of discovery and trial preparation, any other judge 
of the Third Judicial District Court could hear dispositive 
motions and a trial, all in less time than Judge Rigtrup. 
Additional expense to the parties will be minimal. 
IV. Prudential Did Not Waive Disqualification. 
Judge Rigtrup disclosed his biases and prejudices and 
his financial interest as he was ruling on the merits of the 
case. The Madsens contend (Points V, VI, VII, their brief at 
11-15) Prudential should have objected before he stated his 
ruling and because Prudential did not, its motion for 
disqualification was waived. The argument is not correct. 
Prudential objected timely and vigorously, both at the trial 
and afterwards. 
!3 See Abramson, n. 11, supra at 27; and cases collected at 
n. 12, supra at 27-28. 
Immediately upon hearing Judge Rigtrup's initial 
declaration that he had been a borrower, Mr. Palmer stood, 
interrupted, and told the court it was news to him. He was 
interrupted each time by the court. (R. at 783, line 21; at 
784, lines 1 and 8; at 786, line 6.) With each interruption, 
Judge Rigtrup steadfastly contended he had previously disclosed 
the information to Prudential in the presence of other counsel 
working on the four related interest-on-reserve cases (Peter w. 
Billings, Sr., Richard W. Giauque, John P. Ashton, and Edward 
J. McDonough). (R. at 784-785.) Mr. DeBry claimed he could 
recall the disclosure. (R. at 785, line 12.) Nevertheless, 
Mr. Palmer told the court he could not remember it. Trying to 
stop the court, Mr. Palmer said he ". . . didn't want to go on 
and let the court note— . . .", when Judge Rigtrup interrupted 
again and proceeded to speak. (R. at 786, lines 6-7.) After 
seven sentences, Mr. DeBry rose to protest the court's 
"champerty and maintenance" remark. Judge Rigtrup ordered him 
to sit down three times, saying "You can take exceptions after 
I get done." That and the "sit down" order obviously applied 
to both counsel. (R. at 786, line 25; at 787, line 3; at 788, 
line 24.) After ruling, the court asked: "Do you desire to 
make any further exceptions. . . . " (R. at 798, line 12; 
emphasis added.) Prudential's point had not been lost on the 
court. 
Judge Rigtrup recognized that as he ruled, he ruled in 
the face of a claim for disqualification. He prefaced his 
decision with this remark: "I guess if that [his having an 
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undisclosed mortgage with Prudential] creates error, it creates 
error. But so be it." (R. at 785, lines 7-8.) 
Judge Fishier read the transcript of the post-trial 
proceeding and heard the parties* oral argument. He agreed 
with Prudential. After reading the transcript and reflecting 
on his many years as a litigator, he believed Prudential had 
objected as best it could. In the hearing on November 22, 
1985, Judge Fishier noted: 
The Court: I am going to find that at the time 
that Judge Rigtrup made his ruling, that it would have 
been futile to attempt to stop the proceedings at that 
point; that both Mr. DeBry and Mr. Palmer attempted to 
interrupt the Judge during his ruling, but that the 
Judge was ruling and did not care to be interrupted, 
and completed his ruling and has ruled. 
Also you have to put in there that attempts were 
made by Mr. DeBry and Mr. Palmer to object at the time 
of the ruling, but the objections were not made 
because the Judge was not inclined to hear their 
objections at that time. 
Mr. DeBry: I got my objection in. 
The Court: All I saw, Mr. DeBry, is you were 
told to sit down an awful lot. 
Mr. DeBry: DeBry stood up, interrupted the 
Judge, made a timely objection. 
The Court: But as I get the tenor of the 
transcript, as I see it, is that 
Mr. DeBry: Well, the Judge is pushy. But the 
point is DeBry didn't gamble. I made my objection on 
the record. 
The Court: Well, I don't see that. I think 
there comes a time — and I've been down there, Mr. 
DeBry, as you know, more than I've been up here, and I 
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know there comes a point in time that it's best to sit 
down and shut up, [ride] it out and take your licks, 
and move on to the next level of the judiciary. 
And from the tenor of — that's what I glean — I 
glean that that was the situation from the transcript. 
(R. at 804, lines 15-21; at 820, lines 8-25; at 821, lines 
1-6.) Then, in a hearing in December, 1985, Judge Fishier made 
the point again: 
The Court: Well, my inclination on the 
timeliness is that it was. I'll read the transcript 
once again, but I think you have to read that 
transcript and I think you have to -- you have to read 
the transcript, and I think you have to know a little 
bit about judges and lawyers and a courtroom 
proceeding and what lawyers do. And I think that any 
lawyer who's been around a courthouse very much knows 
when to sit down and shut up, and it may be that type 
of situation. 
(R. at 871, lines 21-25; at 872, lines 1-4.) 
Rule 63 governs disqualification. It requires the 
filing of a detailed affidavit and a good faith certificate of 
counsel. These pleadings are indispensible prerequisites for 
disqualification of a judge. Prudential could not have moved 
for disqualification during Judge Rigtrup's oral comments 
because it then lacked (and could not have anticipated the need 
for) the necessary paperwork. 
Notice the court and Mr. DeBry both stated 
affirmatively at the hearing that they remembered the 
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disclosure had been made of Judge Rigtrup's mortgage with 
Prudential. Before the pleadings required by Rule 63 could be 
filed, Mr. Palmer was obligated to verify the absolutely 
contradictory claims made by the court and by Mr. DeBry 
concerning prior disclosures. ". . .[A] request for the 
disqualification of a trial judge is a most serious undertaking 
which should not be pursued absent thorough factual 
investigation and legal research." Johnson v. District Court, 
674 P.2d 952, 957 (Colo. 1984). Judge Fishier agreed: 
. . . [Wjhen Judge Rigtrup made his statements 
about being a former borrower of Prudential . . . 
insufficient notice was given to Prudential's counsel 
of the facts to allow counsel to confer with his 
client to determine the appropriate course of action. 
(R. 239.) 
Rule 63 requires the filing of the paperwork "as soon 
as practicable after . . . bias or prejudice is known." 
Prudential met that standard. 
After Judge Rigtrup's remarks, Prudential could only 
investigate the facts and prepare the necessary paperwork. 
Further colliquy between court and counsel would not have 
changed anything. Following trial, Mr. Palmer reviewed 
personal notes he had taken at prior meetings with the court in 
this and the four re-lated cases; -he*-discussed the matter with 
counsel identified by the court; he discussed it with officers 
of Prudential; and he took the time to order, receive, and 
review a partial transcript of the hearing. After that 
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investigation had been completed and Mr. Palmer was satisfied 
Judge Rigtrup and Mr. DeBry were mistaken, he followed Rule 
63. He drafted the Motion, the Affidavit of Disqualification, 
the Certificate of Counsel, and the supporting memorandum; and 
he prepared the supporting affidavits of other counsel and then 
obtained the affiants' signatures. All of that was 
accomplished in less than forty days. Meanwhile, no other 
proceedings intervened between the ruling Prudential tried to 
stop and the filing of the Motion for Disqualification. 
Prudential was not dilatory. 
A finding of waiver requires more than mere passage of 
time. See Johnson v. District Court, supra. True waiver 
occurs, rather, when a party knows of grounds for 
disqualification but still allows the judge to hear matters 
14 going to the merits of the action. See State ex rel. Welfare 
Division of State Department of Health, Welfare and 
Rehabilitation v. Eighth Judicial District Court, Department 
Four, 85 Nev. 642, 462 P.2d 37 (1969). The cases cited by the 
Madsens (their brief at 12-13) are all of this nature. In two 
15 
of the cases, the courts applied an express statutory time 
14
 The clear trend in federal courts (under statutory law~> 
court interpretation, and the Code of Judicial Conduct for 
United States Judges) is that disqualification cannot be 
waived. See 13A Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and 
Procedure: Jurisdiction 2d § 3552 at 648-652. 
The only manner of "waiving" the disqualification of a 
judge under the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct is to follow the 
requirements for remittal in Canon 3(D). 
15
 Aker v. Coleman, 88 P.2d 869, 872-73 (Idaho 1939); State 
ex rel. Shufeldt v. Armiio, 50 P.2d 852, 854-55 (N.M. 1935). 
__ilO_ 
limit for the filing of motions to disqualify. In six of those 
cases, the courts either expressly stated or implied that the 
parties moving for disqualification knew of the grounds for 
disqualification before the judgesconsidered the merits of the 
actions. The three cases quoted by the Madsens (their brief 
at 12-13) fall within the latter category. 
That is not this case. Only at the end of the trial 
did the court reveal what it specifically called its "biases 
and prejudices." The court's oral ruling was made at the same 
time it expressed its bias and prejudice — with the court 
interrupting and disagreeing with counsel, directing counsel to 
sit down, directing counsel that exceptions could be taken 
after the ruling, and noting that if its failure to disclose 
created error, so be it. Most importantly, the disclosure of 
that bias and prejudice necessitated subsequent investigation 
to sustain the motion for disqualification. The motion was 
made as soon as practicable after Judge Rigtrup's prejudice was 
discovered, which is precisely what Rule 63(b) requires. 
One Utah case, Lepasiotes v. Dinsdale, 121 Utah 2d 
359, 242 P.2d 297 (1952), discusses waiver. This Court 
generally affirmed the judgment and specifically held 
the 
16
 In re: United Shoe Machinery Corp., 276 F.2d 77, 79 
(1st Cir. 1960); Rademacher v. City of Phoenix, 442 F.Supp. 27, 
29 (D. Ariz. 1977); Keating v. Superior Court, 289 P.2d 209, 
213 (Cal. 1955); Carpenter v. State, 223 Kan. 523, 575 P.2d 26, 
29 (1978); Jones v. Stivers, 447 S.W.2d 869, 870 (Ky. 1969); 
State ex rel. Shufeldt v. Armiio, 50 P.2d 852, 856 (N.M. 1935). 
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refusal of the trial judge to disqualify himself was 
justified. The defendant's affidavit of disqualification was 
filed after the trial had commenced. Although the affidavit 
focused on a statement made by the judge during trial, its 
contents also incladed matters known before trial. The Court 
held the filing of the affidavit was untimely, commenting: 
[W]here two or more views or interpretations of the 
evidence or the credibility or lack of credibility 
accorded to witnesses might turn the case one way or 
the other, there is present the possibility that the 
prejudice of the judge, if any, could have influenced 
his judgment. In such cases we might, if the 
affidavit were timely filed or even if it were not, 
desire to reverse the case in order to avoid any 
possibility that prejudice influenced the decision. 
(Emphasis added.) 242 P.2d at 297-298. This is certainly a 
credibility case. Judge Rigtrup said he believed the Madsens' 
expert and not Prudential's. 
The claim of waiver also must be weighed against the 
apparent basis for disqualification. If the latter is merely 
technical and the waiver is knowingly and deliberately made, 
that is one thing. If on the other hand, there is a real 
appearance of bias, prejudice or interest, particularly in a 
case that affects a large class of people, then the actions of 
one party ought not be taken as a waiver by or for the benefit 
of the classes. After all, the delay-or waiver does not remove 
the appearance of bias, prejudice, or interest from the court. 
See Lavoie, supra; Haslam, supra at 523-24, 526. 
-44-
V. The Madsens Failed to Meet Their Burden to Show Judge 
Rigtrup Disclosed His Interest. 
One issue raised before Judge Fishier was whether 
Judge Rigtrup had properly disclosed to the parties his 
trust-deed relationship with Prudential. Judge Fishier noted 
the evidence on the question was conflicting and held neither 
party carried the burden of proof that Judge Rigtrup had or had 
not disclosed his interest. The Madsens now contend Prudential 
had the burden of proof on the issue, that Prudential failed to 
carry that burden, and, therefore, Prudential's motion to 
disqualify Judge Rigtrup should have been denied. The argument 
is ill-founded. 
First, the Madsens1 argument advocates, in effect, an 
impermissable exception to the rule that an interested judge 
is disqualified. Second, the remittal procedure prescribed by 
Judicial Canon 3(D) was not followed; the disclosure of Judge 
Rigtrup*s financial interest was not "on the record." Third, 
the party who seeks disqualification, bears the burden of 
showing prejudice (be it real or apparent) or financial 
interest. The five cases cited by the Madsens (their brief at 
18) say only that Prudential met its burden by proving Judge 
Rigtrup's pecuniary interest. Judge Fishier then ruled it was 
not insubstantial. The burden then shifted to the Madsens to 
prove either waiver (i.e., that Judge Rigtrup had disclosed his 
mortgage and that Prudential then failed to object) or remittal 
under Canon 3(D). Judge Fishier found Prudential had met its 
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evidentiary burden, but that the Madsens had not met theirs. 
Fourth, the Madsens ignore three other grounds supporting 
disqualification: (i) Judge Rigtrup's remarks at the close of 
trial which gave the appearance of prejudice and bias; (ii) he 
was a debtor of Prudential's and, as such, is a potential class 
member with an interest in the outcome of the action; and, 
(iii) he has personal knowledge of disputed, material facts, 
VI. Disqualification is Both Prospective and Retroactive. 
Disqualification of a judge works prospectively and 
retroactively. It precludes the judge from performing further 
judicial acts and it voids those non-ministerial acts performed 
already. 
A. Prospective Application. 
The plain language of Rule 63(b) is controlling. Once 
an affidavit of disqualification is filed against a judge, 
". . . such judge shall proceed no further. . . ." He 
immediately loses all power and authority over the case except 
to refer the disqualification motion to another judge for 
decision. If disqualification is eventually ordered, " . . . 
another judge must be called in to try the case or determine 
the matter in question." The disqualified judge lacks 
jurisdiction to proceed. 
A disqualified judge lacks jurisdiction to perform 
. . . . 17 judicial acts calling for exercise of judicial discretion. 
17 See Pueblo of Laguna v. Cillessen & Son, Inc., 101 N.M. 
341, 682 P.2d 197 (1984); Creel v. Shadlev, 266 Or. 494, 513 
P.2d 755 (1973); Hordvk v. Farlev, 94 Ariz. 189, 382 P.2d 668 
(1963); Postal Mutual Indemnity Co. v. Ellis, 169 S.W.2d 482 
(Tex. 1943). 
A C 
If he does act, his orders are void. 
Making findings of fact and conclusions of law, and 
rendering judgment are all discretionary, judicial 
19 
activities. Entering findings and conclusions is no less 
discretionary when the judge has orally ruled and explained his 
ruling from the bench; he can be persuaded to change his ruling 
and findings, or do so himself at anytime. See State ex rel. 
Wilson v. Kav, 164 Wash. 685, 4 P.2d 498, 500-501 (1931). 
Judge Rigtrup's ruling certainly would require the skillful 
drafting of findings and conclusions: "From all my rambling, 
Mr. DeBry, can you draft an intelligent set of findings, 
conclusions and whatever?" (R. at 798, lines 8-10.) Thus, 
these acts fall within the rule and may not properly be brought 
before a disqualified judge. Having been disqualified, Judge 
1 8
 This is the majority rule. Beckford v. District Court, 
698 P.2d 1323, 1330 (Colo. 1985) notes the principle and lists 
illustrative decisions from Alaska, Arizona, California, 
Florida, Illinois, New Mexico, Oregon, and Texas. See also 
State v. Nossaman, 63 Or. App. 789, 666 P.2d 1351 (1983); Hoff 
v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 79 Nev. 108, 378 P.2d 977 
(1963). 
1 9
 "It is the duty of a trial court to make findings of 
fact with respect to all contested issues in a case." 
Ouagliana v. Exquisite Home Builders, Inc., 538 P.2d 301, 305 
(Utah 1975). To make those findings, the Court first must 
weigh the relevant evidence. That is not a clerical task. It 
requires judicial discretion to pick and choose evidence, to 
draw factual conclusions, to couple those facts with specific 
law, and then artfully to commit all of it to paper. See, 
e.g., Christensen v. Christensen, 628 P.2d 1297, 1301 (Utah 
1981); In re Adoption of McKinstrav v. McKinstray, 628 P.2d 
1286, 1289 (Utah 1981). The rendition of judgment is a 
judicial function, too. In Re Estate of Penn, 216 Kan. 153, 
531 P.2d 133, 137 (1975). 
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could not continue to sit upon the case to enter findings and 
conclusions. Rule 63 forbids it. See Anderson v. Anderson, 13 
Utah 2d 36, 368 P.2d 264 (1962). Prudential is entitled, 
simply as a matter of due process of law, to have a judge who 
do°s not have the appearance of bias, or an interest, rule upon 
those discretionary matters. 
The Madsens rely heavily on Coastal Petroleum Co. v. 
Mobil Oil Corp.. 378 So.2d 336 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980). It 
has no application. There, the parties' claims were severed 
for two separate trials. At the conclusion of the first trial, 
the judge apparently made inappropriate statements regarding 
the issues left to be tried in the second action. One of the 
parties filed an application for disqualification based on 
those statements. The judge considered the application and 
recused himself from trial of the remaining issues which had 
been severed for the second trial, specifically reserving 
jurisdiction to rule on those matters already tried. The 
appellate court found nothing wrong with the judge's procedure 
since the inappropriate remarks were related only to the second 
trial and did not taint his management of the first. 
B. Retroactive Application. 
Disqualification taints all discretionary activities 
of the judge, including those performed before disqualification 
is ordered. "[T]he fact of disqualification relates back and 
renders all the orders or judicial acts taken by [the trial 
judge] void and nugatory." King v. Ellis, 146 Ga. App. 157, 
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246 S.E.2d 1/ 2 (1978). As a consequence, then, " . . . the 
action must proceed again from the beginning before some judge 
who is not disqualified." Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation 
District v. Superior Court, 182 Cal. 315, 187 P. 1056, 1065 
(1920). Were this not true, the adverse, discretionary acts 
made by a judge prior to his disqualification could never be 
corrected. Nor could a party urge disqualification after 
judgment where the grounds for disqualification were not known 
20 
until then. 
This Court has adopted a similar approach. In 
Lepasiotes v. Dinsdale, supra at 297-98, the Court noted that 
". . .we might . . . desire to reverse . . . in order to avoid 
any possibility that prejudice influenced the decision." The 
Court renewed its commitment to the principle in Christensen v. 
Christensen, 18 Utah 2d 315, 422 P.2d 534 (1967). The required 
affidavit of prejudice was filed after judgment was entered, 
although the disqualifying acts were known to the affiant 
beforehand. The Court refused to disqualify, noting however: 
. . . [The stated grounds for disqualificaton are] no 
reason to justify the use of the affidavit near the 
end of the case, — although there might be a case 
where prejudice so permeated the air as to justify use 
of the jurat to perfume it. 
422 P.2d at 536. 
2 Q
 See Mixon v. United States, 620 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 
1980); Giometti v. Etienne, 219 Cal. 687, 28 P.2d 913 (1934); 
Cadenasso v. Bank of Italy, 214 Cal. 561, 6 P.2d 944 (1932); 
City of Valleio v. Superior Court, 199 Cal. 408, 249 P. 1084 
(1926); Lindsav-Strathmore Irrigation District v. Superior 
Court, supra; King v. Ellis, 146 Ga. App. 157, 246 S.E.2d 1 
(1978); Garland v. State, 110 Ga. App. 756, 140 S.E. 2d 46 
(1964); Gaer v. Bank of Baker, 111 Mont. 204, 107 P.2d 877 
(1940); Marshall v. Amos, 442 P.2d 500 (Okla. 1968); Fry v. 
Tucker, 202 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. 1947). 
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In the December 27th hearing before Judge Fishier, 
even Mr. Debry conceded to the court the retroactive effect of 
disqualification. (R. 845.) Judge Fishier properly found: 
"The Court concludes that the overwhelming weight of authority 
is that disqualification should be retroactive, and this Court 
so holds." (R. 241.) Judge Rigtrup's prior orders were 
vacated and the action assigned to a new judge for retrial. 
CONCLUSION 
Judge Rigtrup gave the "appearance of bias" with his 
remarks at the close of trial; he has a potential interest in 
the outcome of this proceeding which is identical to that of 
the Madsens and the members of the plaintiff class; he has 
personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts, — all of 
these required his disqualification under Rule 63(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the Utah Code of Judicial 
Conduct. He properly was excluded from presiding further over 
this action and his prior orders and decisions were voided. 
The Order of Disqualification entered by Judge Fishier should 
be affirmed. 
DATED this 3rd day of February, 1987. 
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C. 
Reid E. Lewis 
Attorneys for Prudential 
Federal Savings & Loan 
Association 
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1 the convenience of the record for closings? 
2 MR. DeBRY: We are prepared to proceed with 
3 closing at the convenience of the Court. If it's getting 
4 late — 
5 THE COURT: I'm just talking about the 
6 record. 
7 MR. DeBRY: Oh, we don't need a reporter. 
8 MR. PALMER: You mean for closing arguments? 
g J Oh, I think it should be reported, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Very well. 
[Whereupon, closing arguments were presented 
to the Court by respective counsel.] 
13 I THE COURT: I had thought earlier that 
14 J I might go home and spend some time with the case, but 
I've decided that I'd rather let you gentlemen twist 
and turn for the weekend rather than me. So I'll share 
17 I the benefits of my decision with you at this point. 
18 The difficultyof the case is not because 
19 of the battle of the experts, and I think I've got some 
20 valuable training in that at the Public Service Commission, 
21 I suppose that has a personal flavor, because I respect 
22 both of these gentlemen. I-like both of them. And the 
23 difficulty is that they react like former fellow Public 
24 Service commissioners, they will take my opinion or my 
25 ruling or my view as a personal affront to them, maybe. 
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And that's certainly unfortunate. That's not why the 
case is a problem to the Court. I have had incremental 
kinds of suffering for four years in that these two lawyers] 
have tested me, they have twisted me and they have pulled 
and tugged me and jerked and proposed every conceivable 
concept that you could come up with, and the substance — 
I'll expose my biases and my prejudices and be very frank 
with you. 
I think there are some substantial kinds 
of policy things that have really caused me great trouble 
and trauma. As I've indicated earlier, and no objection 
was interposed, I was a customer of Prudential Federal 
Savings & Loan Association and paid without default for 
25 years at four and three-quarters per cent, and I knew 
that was such a fine deal that my wife couldn't get to 
remodel or move or anything because I was 23years old 
when I first took the mortgage out, and I computed that 
out and I thought, why, those robbers, they are charging 
me twice what I'm borrowing from them, and that's unfair. 
As I get older and more sophisticated I — 
MR. PALMER: Your Honor, I hate to interrupt,! 
but I need to make the point that this is news to me, 
that you had been a customer of Prudential. 
THE COURT: I indicated that on several 
occasions. 
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 MR. PALMER: I beg the Court's pardon, 
2 but that is news to me. I don't recall that at all — 
3 if anybody else does — recall you telling me that, and 
4 i — 
5
 THE COURT: I indicated that in these earlier! 
6 meetings that I had paid my loan off at some point, and 
7 I'd had a loan with Prudential Federal Savings. 
8
 MR. PALMER: Perhaps the Court is thinking 
9 of conferences with other counsel. The reason I make 
10 the point is — 
11 THE COURT: My earlier conferences were 
12 not with the two of you in this case, they were with 
13 Mr. Billings, with Mr. Ashton, with you, with Mr. Giauque, 
14 Mr. McDonough, with respect to whoever he represents. 
15 It was Mr. Giauque or someone from that office. They 
16 J were a corrective kind of a deal. 
MR. PALMER: In any event, I stand to raise 
the point now that it is news to us. I believe it — 
I take it that the Court did not feel that it had any 
20 I prejudice because of that. 
21 I THE COURT: No. 
MR. PALMER: All right. 
23
 I THE COURT: I have a recollection that 
24 J somewhere along the line I did make that disclosure. 
I don't know how you could be part of the community and 
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be a homeowner and not have borrowed from someone. And 
so I think I make it very clear in one of those collective 
kinds of meetings that my loan had been with Prudential 
Federal. 
At any ratef it's a fact, and it was somethinj 
that I never tried to hide or have hid from anyone. So 
there's no sense of covering up. I guess if that creates 
error, it creates error. But so be it. I have a recollect] 
that I did expose it, and whether you were there or 
Mr. Lewis or anyone else, I don't know. I did make the 
disclosure early on. 
MR. DeBRY: I do recall some converstions, 
I think, off the record, of that effect, and I honestly 
don't recall who was present. But it was a comment that 
was made from time to time. 
MR. PALMER: Could I inquire of the Court 
when the loan was paid off? 
THE COURT: Probably two years ago. I'm 
not sure at what pint in the discussions I indicated 
that, but I'm sure that in the presence of the collective 
group that I indicated that I had been a borrower of 
Prudential Federal Savings. 
MR. PALMER: No prejudice arose in the 
Court's mind because of the fact that we collected a 
mortgage escrow from you? 
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1 THE COURT: No. 
2 MR. PALMER: Okay. I can't do anything 
3 else but ask. 
4 THE COURT: That's what I've been trying 
5 to tell you. That was the intention. 
MR. PALMER: I make the point because I 
7 I didn't want to go on and let the Court note — 
8 THE COURT: I think I've made general comment] 
9 I throughout that I have cussed financial institutions, 
and customers do simply because they see inherent injustice) 
about that. And my perspective today, after 23 years 
has passed, has become much, much different at the end 
of the 23 years. Far before that I could see the cost 
of money was markedly greater, and that I would be a 
damn fool to prepay. So I paid faithfully every month 
for 25 years, and not a day sooner or a day later. And 
17 I I'm just commenting generally in terms of unjust or whatevejr 
18 The tension is between that to be gained and that to 
19 be lost, 1 suppose, in my eyes. And I have a feeling 
20 that class actions are a form of champerty in maintenance 
21 in that the one that substantially^ gains is the lawyer 
22 or the expert. Mr. Madsen stands to gain little,_ except 
23 he has struck a blow for freedom, I suppose, in the form 
24 that the consumer has achieved balance. 
25 Be seated, Mr. DeBry. 
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MR. DeBRY: I want to make an objection 
on the record. I really must. 
THE COURT: Well, sit down. 
MR. DeBRY: Before you give your decision, 
I must make a comment, because I know the Court is being 
candid and this has been a long struggle, and Prudential 
says they are almost broke before this. And you say 
maybe DeBry will make some money, but I haven't yet. 
But I really must interpose an objection at this point. 
If the Court harbors this type of personal bias with 
respect to — 
THE COURT: I'm just — 
MR. DeBRY: — class actions. 
THE COURT: I'm just telling you about 
the tension. 
MR. DeBRY: I must object to the Court's 
sitting on this case if you have that kind of bias. 
THE COURT: I'm just telling you why I'm 
getting to my ruling and how I'm getting to my ruling 
and being open and candid with both of you. But that's 
a built-in problem with class actions. They have achieved 
a beneficial result. The difficult I am locked into is 
that I have got to follow the law of the case. I have 
got the Supreme Court that's telling me what to do. I 
have got a prior trial judge that's told me what to do 
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1
 as well, and the law is clear that I have got to do what 
2
 Judge Croft told me to do, because he has ruled on the 
3 J issue. I have got to do what the Supreme Court ahs told 
me to do, because they have ruled on the issue. And 
5 | independent of what my personal thoughts or beliefs 
6
 I are, I'm caught in a catch 22, and there is a realistic 
7
 I tension in that process. 
8
 The tension is that in terms of the magnitudej 
9 of the wear, what is to be gained by Mr. Madsen is 
10 J de minimis. On the other hand, if the Court looks at 
economic realities, the high cost of money, high cost 
12 I of labor and high cost of everything else, there is a 
13 societal interest in maintaining healthy, vital financial 
14 I institutions that have the ability to fund building 
15 | construction, homes, and so forth, in our community 
And I simply observe that probably the savings and loan 
17
 | associations have been very instrumental and important 
in that particular process. I simply make those as an 
overview statement sayto what has troubled me, and it's 
trouble me for a long time. 
That's why I have invited you two to sit 
down and strike a settlement, xather than impress that 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 j heavy burden upon me. 
24
 I Sit down, Mr. DeBry, 
25
 I MR. DeBRY: Your Honor — 
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THE COURT: You can take exceptions after 
I get done. I'm trying to — 
MR. DeBRY: I might note that I do have 
an exception to take at this time before you give your 
verdict in this matter. 
THE COURT: I haven't given a verdict. 
MR. DeBRY: With respect to class actions. 
THE COURT: I understand. That's where 
the tension lies. And it's a troublesome decision. It's 
bothered me for a long time. 
This is basically a contract case. It's 
a contract that was executed by people in Utah, to be 
performed in Utah. It's not a federal case. It's not 
a federal regulation case. The federal courts sent it 
back to Utah to be resolved in the Utah courts. My 
predecessor, Judge Croft, certified it as a class action. 
I'm not the appellate court. I can't reverse Judge Croft 
and until the Supreme Court corrects that as an error, 
if it is, it's a class action. It has been certified 
and it is the function of this case as I ruled, and as 
I think I'm compelled to rule, that as the Supreme Court 
said, as a matter of contract law, the language contained 
in the contract in question created a pledge, and that 
based upon that pledge, Mr. Madsen and his wife were 
entitled to an accounting for profits made, and were 
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1 entitled, at minimum, to an offset against their indebtedne] 
2 or I'd assume it would follow, a disgorgement of those 
3 profits. 
4 I view that as the law of the case, and 
5 inescapable. I also don't view this, even though cast 
6 in the context of unjust enrichment, it gives me the 
7 prerogative of trying the case based upon just and unjust 
8 in terms of enrichment. 
g J The Supreme Court says that the Madsens 
are entitled to an accounting for profits, so that is 
what I think I am obliged to follow. I'm not troubled 
at all by burden of proof. As far as I see day in and 
13 I <3aY out, the concept was told over and over and over 
14 J to me as a lawyer, as I practiced in these courts, by 
D. Frank Wilkins in his rule, which was "He who alleges, 
must prove." 
17 I That is the basic fundamental rule in this 
18 case. And the Court, given those limitations and 
19 restrictions, had been tortured in terms of the decisional 
20 process in this matter. Whether one becomes an expert 
21 or one does not, it's not a requirement or prerequisite 
22 I that you-abandon, common sense. Mr. Norman knows that 
I graduated in accounting. So I do have some background. 
I think too much, at times, is made of 
ss, 
15 
16 
23 
24 
25 the fact that it almost rises to a point of science rather 
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1 than an art, though you use the term art. And I guess 
2 the best common sense example of why I perceive there 
3 is some overkill in the area is that I was a farm boy, 
4 and farmers, with the corner of their shopping bag and 
5 a lead pencil, could do more in 15 minutes grappling 
5 with weather, grappling with soil conditions, grappling 
7 with fertilizing problems, grappling with a choice of 
8 seeds and all that they have to program in, and still 
9 J persist in that activity day in and day out. And that's 
something which seems to me could confound enough cost 
accountants to circle the globe. It's not a science, 
it's an exercise in judgment. 
And it seems to me that if the conclusions 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 that are followed by the cost accounting approach are 
15 
16 
followed, management would have failed a long time ago. 
The funds are and have been of benefit to Prudential 
17 I Federal Savings & Loan over the years. They provide 
18 a base over which to spread costs. They provide a hedge 
t9 against default, and provide security. 
20 I realize there are some federal regulations 
21 about that, though Prudential, as did other savings and 
22 loans, banks, and other institutions/ followed the state 
23 statute in terms of turning that practice around. And 
24 as I recall, part of the regulation provided that state 
25 law could be files. But if in the last years when costs, 
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1 as you indicated, Mr. Norman, went up enormously — as 
2 they did — Prudential Federal, if it really strictly 
3 followed that analysis, would have somehow found a lower 
4 cost alternative rather than keep a loss leader* I give 
5 them more credit than that. 
6 There were certainly triple A accounts 
7 that weren't collection problems in those accounts. And 
8 I as to those, I would submit that they would have found 
9 J some sort of service bureau, or whatever, to perform 
that function. The generation of deposits, the generation 
of loans are essential productive features of their 
bueiness. The function of escrow accounts is a nonessential 
function, other than as they perceive it to be essential 
14 | by virtue of federal regulations. And the process of 
15 | billing, receiving payments, and many of those other 
16 I things is not greatly different,with or without escrow 
17 accounts 
18 The Court is persuaded of that clearly 
19 and convincingly by a preponderance of the evidence 
20 It follows as night the day. 
21 I had experience as a young lawyer, going 
22 I out and opening an office, of doing a lot of collection 
work. You do get established, and one lawyer and one 
24 I good secretary can push an awful lot of volume and paper, 
25 and that was before word processing and the fine things 
10 
11 
12 
13 
23 
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1 that lawyers have today. We understood that there ere 
2 lithographs and other ways to maybe accomplish these 
3 things in a less efficient way, but nonetheless, you 
4 learn in a short time how to handle great volumes of 
5 paperwork with a very small amount of people. 
6 I'm convinced in a very persuasive way 
7 that the function of servicing escrow accounts is not 
3 a monumental task, and that it can be achieved by a relatively 
9 small amount of people. Once you shift from an escrow 
10 environment to a nonescrow environment, many of the functions 
U that are performed in that department aren't going to 
12 be greatly diminished. They are going to keep the building), 
13 they are going to keep the data processing capabilities, 
14 and I'm really persuaded by Mr. Stewart's analysis that 
15 if you have an appropriate allocation, it more common-
15 sensically follows that those costs be attributed to 
17 the productive aspects of the business. 
18 It does not appear to be rational at all, 
19 as per Exhibit 8, that costs would escalate in that fashion) 
20 and they would still maintain that function without making 
21 some big corrections. 
22 I think Mr. Norman and Mr. Stewart would 
23 both recognize the judgment aspect of any allocation 
24 process, and I think they would both recognize that they 
25 neither one may have the perfect solution or all of the 
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1 j answers. 
2 I * think they both would be candid, and 
3 I respect them for both being honest and upfront. If 
4 the computerized and mechanization process added such 
5 a heavy burden to the cost, xt would have been a better 
6 management decision to persist with shoe boxes and a 
7 mechanical process, rather than allowing the costs to 
8 double in a short period of time when the benefit to 
9 be gained was as minimal as it was. 
I think, moreover, Mr. Stewart's analysis 
of the escrow account balances were, as I recall, in 
the range of 20 per cent lower. I don't know whether 
that's more accurate or less accurate than your analysis, 
Mr. Norman, except that it demonstrates a conservative 
bias in favor of Prudential Federal rather than Mr. Madsen, 
There was something said about working 
capital, that it also seems to me there is — I think 
it's maybe unrealistic and idealistic to think that there 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 j is instantaneous management of those funds, and there 
20 » may be a little bias in the analysis of Mr. Stewart, 
21 and there is some justification of working capital slack. 
22 Moreover, given the high interest rates and the levels 
23 
24 
we're talking about, management doesn't let large amounts 
of uninvested funds go for 60 days, and they are moving 
25 them into a mode of investment where they can derive 
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1 daily yield-kind of investments at times to keep the 
2 funds working. As for the assignment of a lot of costs, 
3 I'm impressed that the building is a sunk cost, and the 
4 assignment of a large amount of that really doesn't track 
5 the function. 
6 I I'm convinced that advertising to generate 
7 the productive aspect of the business; namely, loans 
8 and deposits, doesn't have as part of its function to 
generate escrow business. They are not in the business, 
10 | really, of providing escrow business as a primary function. 
And I think the bulk of the high level management decisions] 
really aren't involved in managing day-to-day escrow 
decisions. It seems to the Court that most of that is 
14 | clerical and doesn't require the highest order of skills. 
15 | The high order of skills are more required, 
16 I though, in terms of investment decisions and things of 
17 that kind. So to apportion a substantial portion of 
18 that to that process appears to the court to be non founded] 
19 in common sense 
20 There were other specific things that I 
21 think are of similar rationality as far as I view the 
22 overall record. If the Court feels it had an unjust 
23 enrichment kind of case, I think the Court would find 
24 the decision easy. But my perception is that I am locked 
25 in by a decision of the Supreme Court that simply found 
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1 I it to be a pledge, and that those funds had to be accounted 
2 for to the customer. And it's that plain and simple, 
3 and it's put me in a tortuous kind of position that, 
4 notwithstanding my underlying Liases and feelings, I 
6 feel that I have no choice. 
6 I think there have been errors in both 
7 analyses in one way or another, but in thinking about 
g it all, the court finds and concludes that the approach 
9 J that Mr. Stewart took in his Schedule 7, which uses the 
short-term T-bill rate more closely approximates the 
short period of turnover with escrow accounts and the 
investment options. And the court finds it reasonable 
to conclude that on the Madsen account, during the period 
from March 3, 1971 through June 30, 1979, that there 
was total cumulative earnings on the Madsen account earned 
of $109.43. And that it would further be appropriate, 
17 I as a finding,that as a matter of fact, that the Madsens 
18 would have a total cumulative effect of earnings on those 
19 funds bringing the total to $134.70. 
20 MR. PALMER: $134.70? 
21 THE COURT: Yes. Plaintiffs, accordingly, 
22 are awarded judgment 'for $134.70 plus allowable costs. 
23 And with respect to the mechanics, I haven't worked out 
24 anything with respect to the overall class impact it 
25 would have. So the issue of what the ramifications are 
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1 on a class basis are reserved for future consideration 
2 to be determined, with both of you to have an opportunity 
3 to review those matters as to how that should work out. 
4 MR. PALMER: Could I inquire, when the 
5 Court says that if this were an unjust enrichment case, 
6 the decision would be easy, what the Court means by that? 
7 THE COURT: I really — my visceral reaction 
3 is that I don't feel there's unjust enrichment. 
9 MR. DeBRY: Well, with that being said, 
10 however, in the context that in this case we didn't put 
H on any evidence as to that. 
12 THE COURT: I make no finding thereon. 
13 I'm being candid with both of you. It's a tortuous process! 
14 for me. I think economic reality, considering all interest] 
15 involved, even though corporations make profits and so 
16 forth, it bothers me, that bottom-line result, if I'm 
17 affirmed. But I think the evidence dictates that I must 
18 find otherwise. 
19 MR. PALMER: All right. I anticipate, 
20 or I would have anticipated that regardless of which 
21 side prevails at this point, that there would be an appeal 
22 THE COURT: I certainly recognize that, 
23 and that's why I made the comments the second day, that 
24 the two experts perhaps could bring some reason and 
25 rationality to the thing, because of the enormous cost. 
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1 It's been a burdensome thing and it's not easy for Mr. DeBry 
2 to carry the battle, and it's been a very costly one 
3 for him going forward, and a very costly process for 
4 Prudential to defend. And I sort of think that once 
5 this statute was amended to allow the customer the choice 
5 of one thing or the other,the battle, to a large measure, 
7 had been fairly won. But I don't think I have any choices 
8 From all of my rambling, Mr. DeBry, can 
9 I you draft an intelligent set of findings, conclusions 
and whatever? 
MR. DeBRY: Yes. Thank you,. 
THE COURT: Do you desire to make any further] 
exceptions to my — 
14 | MR. DeBRY: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: — my openness and candor? 
MR. DeBRY: No. 
17 I MR. PALMER: Well, what I'm suggesting 
18 is that I expect that there will be an appeal before 
19 I w e 9 e t into the class issues, and I would anticipate 
findings and a judgment be presently entered in favor 
of Mr. Madsen. 
10 
11 
12 
13 
15 
16 
20 
21 
23 
24 
22 MR. DeBRY: Well, perhaps that's a job 
for another day. We'll have to take your ruling and 
think about it and decide. We'll suggest to the Court 
25 what further steps are indicated, 
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1 THE COURT: Would you submit that to 
2 Mr. Palmer? 
3 MR. DeBRY: Yes. 
4 THE COURT: In advance, and allow me some 
5 leeway. I have got a month-long trial set for October, 
6 and so I'm going to be locked in to that time-wise. And 
7 if you've got objections or whatever, if we can get hearingj 
8 early in the morning or late in the afternoon, I'll certainlly 
9 J be able to accommodate those kinds of things. 
The reporter gets to go home at 5:00 on 
usual business, though I'll note for the record that 
it1s now 5:58. 
MR. DeBRY: We thank the Court and staff 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 for your attention and the courtesies extended, 
15 
16 
THE COURT: It's been a stimulating and 
challenging experience, but it really is not a very easy 
17 I process, because it seems to me that the Court is in 
18 a position that clearly,in a case like that, you can't 
19 help but be damned if you do and damned if you don't, 
20 in either respect. And it's not a half-a-loaf kind of 
21 a case. 
22 I realize that taking the lower figure 
23 of Mr. Stewart may appear to be that way, but I recognize 
24 that there are some reasonable areas that you could criticize 
25 maybe some of the assumptions he made, as well as those 
siav} 
- v ^ 
1 of Mr. Norman. 
2 We'll be in recess. 
3 [Evening recess commencing at 5:58 p.m.] 
4 I -ooOoo-
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD MADSEN and NANCY 
MADSEN, his wife, for 
themselves and all others 
similarly situated, 
vs. 
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS & 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, for itself 
and all others similarly 
situated, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. 226073 
This case comes before the Court as a class action brought 
by plaintiffs seeking to have Judgment against the defendant 
Prudential for interest on money held by Prudential in reserve 
accounts• 
The case was tried before the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, 
District Judge, sitting without a jury. At the conclusion of 
the evidence and arguments of counsel, Judge Rigtrup commented 
from the bench on several subjects, and indicated his decision 
based upon the law and evidence. 
Prior to the signing and filing of Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and Judgment, the defendant Prudential moved to have 
Judge Rigtrup disqualified. Thereafter, the issue of Judge 
Rigtrup1s disqualification was referred to this division of 
the Court for resolution. 
ADDENDUM B 
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MADSEN V. PRUDENTIAL PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
The plaintiffs have raised the issue of timeliness, claiming 
that defense counsel did not raise his objection to Judge Rigtrup 
hearing the case in a timely fashion. In reviewing the transcript 
of the proceedings before Judge Rigtrup on September 5, 1985, 
it is clear that Judge Rigtrup was about to rule, and that when 
Judge Rigtrup made his statements about being a former borrower 
of Prudential that insufficient notice was given to Prudentialfs 
counsel of this fact to allow counsel to confer with his client 
to determine the appropriate course of action. 
The filing of an Affidavit of Prejudice against the judge 
before whom the client and attorney have a case pending is a 
serious matter and not one to be undertaken lightly, or without 
the client and the attorney conferring. In reviewing the transcript, 
this Court concludes that counsel for the defendant could not 
be expected to interrupt the proceedings to file an Affidavit 
of Prejudice. Therefore, the argument that the objection was 
not timely is without merit. 
The next issue that must be addressed is whether the Judge 
in question was biased, and prejudiced within the meaning of 
Rule 63 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Utah Supreme 
Court in Haslam v. Morrison, 113 Utah 14, 190 P.2d 520 (1948) 
held that actual bias and prejudice on the part of a judge dis-
qualifies that judge. The court stated: 
MADSEN V. PRUDENTIAL PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Bias and prejudice means a hostile feeling 
or spirit of ill will toward one of the 
litigants, or undue friendship or favoritism 
toward one* The fact that a judge may have 
an opinion as to the merits of the cause 
or that he has strong feelings about the 
type of litigation involved does not make 
him biased or prejudiced. 
113 Utah at 20 
There have been no subsequent cases cited to this Court 
concerning the meaning of the term "biased and prejudiced." 
This Court notes, however, that subsequent to Haslam, supra, 
Rule 63 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was adopted by 
the Supreme Court of this state. More importantly, in 1974 
the Utah Supreme Court approved the Code of Judicial Conduct. 
Canon 3(c) provides that a judge should disqualify himself in 
a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be ques-
tioned. 
This Court concludes that the impartiality of Judge Rigtrup 
might be reasonably questioned, and therefore Judge Rigtrup 
should have disqualified himself from hearing the issues raised 
in this case. 
It is disputed as to whether or not Judge Rigtrup would 
be a member of a potential class of individuals who may or may 
not have causes of action against Prudential. Although Judge 
Rigtrup is not a party to this litigation, it is conceivable 
that his rulings could be binding upon Prudential in other similar 
litigation in which Judge Rigtrup could be a plaintiff on a 
MADSEN V. PRUDENTIAL PAGE FOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION 
theory of collateral estoppel. He may therefore have a financial 
interest which would be substantially affected by the outcome 
of the proceeding as defined under Canon 3(c) (1) (c). 
The litigants in this action have raised the issue of remittal 
of disqualification as defined under Canon 3(d). The Court 
has reviewed the Affidavits on file, which are conflicting. 
A remittal of disqualification is in effect an affirmative defense 
to the Motion to Disqualify a sitting judge. In reviewing the 
record, the Court can find nothing which persuades it by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that there was a remittal of the disquali-
fication. 
The Court concludes that the overwhelming weight of authority 
is that the disqualification should be retroactive, and this 
Court so holds. 
Lastly, this Court points out the advice of Justice Wade 
in Haslam, supra: 
One of the most important things in government 
is that all persons subject to its jurisdiction 
shall always be able to obtain ~a fair and 
impartial trial in all matters of litigation 
in its courts. It is nearly as important 
that the people have absolute confidence 
in the integrity of the courts. I can think 
of nothing that would as surely bring the 
courts into disrepute as for a judge to 
insist on trying a case where one of the 
litigants believes that such judge is biased 
and prejudiced against him. 
113 Utah at 25. 
t r & 
MADSEN V. PRUDENTIAL PAGE FIVE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Since no Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law or Judgment 
have been entered in this case, and Judge Rigtrup has been dis-
qualified, a new trial will be held before a Judge to whom the 
case will be assigned. This assignment will be made known to 
the lawyers and litigants by way of a Minute Entry which will 
follow shortly. y*/' 
Dated this Vu dav of January, 1986. 
y 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINDLEY 
CLERK 
By 
Deputy Clerk 
~ni\7fi& 
MADSEN V. PRUDENTIAL PAGE SIX MEMORANDUM DECISION 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the 
following, this (A day of January, 1986: 
Robert J. DeBry 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
965 East 4800 South, Suite 2 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Joseph J. Palmer 
Reid E. Levis 
Attorneys for Prudential Federal 
600 Deseret Plaza 
15 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Peter W. Billings, Esq. 
215 South State, 12th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
John P. Ashton, Esq. 
424 East 500 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Edward McDonough, Esq. 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
William K. Black, Esq. 
Office of General Counsel 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board 
1700 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, D. C. 20552 
K_A 'ixnt&fiaA 
0002A 3 
Salt Lak9 City, Inah 
Attorney for the Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
• • • 
RICHARD MADSEN and NANCY : 
MADSEN, his wife, for them-
selves and all others simi- : 
larly situated, ORDER 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. Civil Nos. 226073 & 798404 
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS & 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, for itself : 
and all others similarly 
situated, : Judge Philip R. Fishier 
Defendant. : 
UTAH BANKERS ASSOCIATION. : 
• • * 
Prudential Federal Savings & Loan's Motion to Disqualify 
the Honorable Kenneth R. Rigtrup, having come on for hearing, the 
Court having heard evidence, considered the memoranda on file, and 
being fully advised <*$ the premisis, it is hereby ordered, adjudged 
and decreed that Judge Rigtrup be and he is hereby disqualified; 
And further that all prior rulings of Judge Rigtrup be 
and the same are hereby set aside on the ground and for the reason 
that although there is no actual bias on the part of Judge Rigtrup, 
MAR 21 1986 
H. Dixon Hindj^ y. Clark 3ru Oist Coun 
By K fMM-KTQSlS* 
(J Dnniit^jrc'^rk 
ADDENDUM C 
there is an appearance of bias as set forth in the Memorandum 
Decision heretofore filed by this Court. 
DATED this & i day of /jSglMWhtr- 1986. 
(T 
BY THE COURT: 
(</7$U_ 
:. Fishier 
District Judge (Presiding) 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINDLEY 
CLERK 
By _ j^ul^m--
Deputy Clerk 
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(b) Disqualification. Whenever a party to any action or proceeding, 
civil or criminal, or his attorney shall make and file an affidavit that the 
judge before whom such action or proceeding is to be tried or heard has a 
bias or prejudice, either against such party or his attorney or in favor of 
any opposite party to the suit, such judge shall proceed no further therein, 
except to call in another judge to hear and determine the matter. 
Every such affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief 
that such bias or prejudice exists, and shall be filed as soon as practicable 
after the case has been assigned or such bias or prejudice is known. If the 
judge against whom the affidavit is directed questions the sufficiency of the 
affidavit, he shall enter an order directing that a copy thereof be forthwith 
certified to another judge (naming him) of the same court or of a court of 
like jurisdiction, which judge shall then pass upon the legal sufficiency of 
the affidavit. If the judge against whom the affidavit is directed does not 
question the legal sufficiency of the affidavit, or if the judge to whom the 
affidavit is certified finds that it is legally sufficient, another judge must be 
called in to try the case or determine the matter in question. No party shall 
be entitled in any case to file more than one affidavit; and no such affidavit 
shall be filed unless accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record that 
such affidavit and application are made in good faith. 
ADDENDUM D 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Approved by the Supreme Court of Utah, March 1, 1974 
CANON 1 
A Judge Should Uphold 
the Integrity and 
Independence of the Judiciary 
An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice 
in our society. A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining, 
and enforcing, and should himself observe, high standards of conduct 
so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary may be preserved. 
The provisions of this Code should be construed and applied to further 
that objective. 
CANON 2 
A Judge Should Avoid 
Impropriety and the Appearance of 
Impropriety in All His Activities 
A. A judge should respect and comply with the law and should conduct 
himself at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in 
the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. 
B. A judge should not allow his family, social, or other relationships to 
influence his judicial conduct or judgment. He should not lend the 
prestige of his office to advance the private interests of others; nor 
should he convey or permit others to convey the impression that they 
are in a special position to influence him. He should not testify 
voluntarily as a character witness. 
CANON 3 
A Judge Should Perform 
the Duties of His Office Impartially 
and Diligently 
The judicial duties of a judge take precedence over all his other 
activities. His judicial duties include all the duties of his office prescribed 
by law. In the performance of these duties, the following standards apply: 
A. Adjudicative Responsibilities. 
(1) A judge should be faithful to the law and maintain professional 
competence in it. He should be unswayed by partisan interests, 
public clamor, or fear of criticism. 
(2) A judge should maintain order and decorum in proceedings before 
him. 
(3) A judge should be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, 
jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom he deals in his 
official capacity, and should require similar conduct of lawyers, 
,and of his staff, court officials, and others subject to his direction 
and control. 
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(4) A judge should accord to every person who is legally interested 
in a proceeding, or his lawyer, full right to be heard according to 
law, and, except as authorized by law, neither initiate nor consider 
ex parte or other communications concerning a pending or impending 
proceeding. A judge, however, may obtain the advice of a dis-
interested expert on the law applicable to a proceeding before him 
if he gives notice to the parties of the person consulted and the 
substance of the advice, and affords the parties reasonable oppor-
tunity to respond. 
(5) A judge should dispose promptly of the business of the court. 
(6) A judge should abstain from public comment about a pending or 
impending proceeding in any court, and should require similar 
abstention on the part of court, personnel subject to his direction 
and control. This subsection does not prohibit judges from making 
public statements in the course of their official duties or from 
explaining for public information the procedures of the court. 
(7) A judge should prohibit broadcasting, televising, recording, or taking 
photographs in the courtroom and areas immediately adjacent thereto 
during sessions of court or recesses between sessions, except that 
a judge may authorize: 
(a) the use of electronic or photographic means for the presentation 
of evidence, for the perpetuation of a record, or for other purposes 
of judicial administration; 
(b) the broadcasting, televising, recording, or photographing of inves-
titive, ceremonial, or naturalization proceedings; 
(c) the photographic or electronic recording and reproduction of 
appropriate court proceedings. 
B. Administrative Responsibilities 
(1) A judge should diligently discharge his administrative responsibili-
ties, maintain professional competence in judicial administration, and 
facilitate the performance of the administrative responsibilites of 
other judges and court officials. 
(2) A judge should require his staff and court officials subject to his 
direction and control to observe the standards of fidelity and dili-
gence that apply to him. 
(3) A judge should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures 
against a judge or lawyer for unprofessional conduct of which the 
judge may become aware. 
(4) A judge should not make unnecessary appointments. He should 
exercise his power of appointment only on the basis of merit, avoid-
ing nepotism and favoritism. He should not approve compensation 
of appointees beyond the fair value of services rendered. 
C. Disqualification. 
(1) A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not 
limited to instances where: 
(a) he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal 
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceed-
ing; 
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(b) he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with 
whom he previously practiced law served during such association 
as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer 
has been a material witness concerning it; 
(c) he knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or 
minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest 
in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceed-
ing, or any other interest that could be substantially affected 
by the outcome of the proceeding; 
(d) he or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relation-
ship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person; 
(i) is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee 
of a party; 
(ii) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; 
(iii) is known by the judge to have an interest that could be sub-
stantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding; 
(iv) is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in 
the proceeding; 
(2) A judge should inform himself about his personal and fiduciary 
financial interests, and make a reasonable effort to inform himself 
about the personal financial interests of his spouse and minor chil-
dren residing in his household. 
(3) For the purposes of this section: 
(a) the degree of relationship is calculated according to the civil law 
system; 
(b) "fiduciary" includes such relationships as executor, administrator, 
trustee, and guardian; 
(c) "financial interest" means ownership of a legal or equitable in-
terest, however small, or a relationship as director, advisor, or 
other active participant in the affairs of a party, except that: 
(i) ownership in a mutual or common investment fund that 
holds securities is not a "financial interest" in such securities 
unless the judge participates in the management of the fund; 
(ii) an office in an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, 
or civic organization is not a "financial interest" in securities 
held by the organization; 
(iii) the proprietary interest of a policy holder in a mutual in-
surance company, of a depositor in.a mutual savings associa-
tion, or a similar proprietary interest, is a "financial interest" 
in the organization only if the outcome of the proceeding 
could substantially affect the value of the interest; 
(iv) ownership of government securities is a "financial interest" 
in the issuer only if the outcome of the proceeding could 
substantially affect the value of the securities. 
D. Remittal of Disqualification. 
A judge may, instead of withdrawing from the proceeding, disclose 
on the record the basis of his disqualification. If, based on such dis-
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closure, the parties and lawyers, independently of the judge's participa-
tion, all agree that the judge's relationship is immaterial or that his 
financial interest is insubstantial, the judge is no longer disqualified, 
and may participate in the proceeding. 
CANON 4 
A Judge May Engage in 
Activities fo Improve the Law, 
the Legal System, and 
the Administration of Justice 
A judge, subject to the proper performance of his judicial duties, may 
engage in the following quasi-judicial activities, if in doing so he does not 
cast doubt on his capacity to decide impartially any issue that may come 
before him: 
A. He may speak, write, lecture, teach, and participate in other activities 
concerning the law, the legal system, and the administration of justice. 
B. He may appear at a public hearing before an executive or legislative 
body or official on matters concerning the law, the legal system, and 
the administration of justice, and he may otherwise consult with an 
executive or legislative body or official, but only on matters concerning 
the administration of justice. 
C. He may serve as a member, officer, or director of an organization or 
governmental agency devoted to the improvement of the law, the legal 
system, or the administration of justice. He may assist such an organi-
zation in raising funds and may participate in their management and 
investment, but should not personally participate in public fund raising 
activities. He may make recommendations to public and private fund-
granting agencies on projects and programs concerning the law, the 
legal system, and the administration of justice. 
CANON 5 
A Judge Should Regulate 
His Extra-Judicial Activities 
to Minimize the Risk of 
Conflict with His Judicial Duties: 
A. Avocational Activities. A judge may write, lecture,: teach, and speak 
on non-legal subjects, and engage in the arts, sports, and other social 
and recreational activities, if such avocational activities do not detract 
from the dignity of his office or interfere with the performance of his 
judicial duties. 
B. Civic and Charitable Activities. A judge may participate in civic and 
charitable activities that do not reflect adversely upon his impartiality 
or interfere with the performance of his judicial duties. A judge may 
serve as an officer, director, trustee, or non-legal advisor of an educa-
tional, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization not conducted 
for the economic or political advantage of its members, subject to the 
following limitations: 
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(1) A judge should not serve if it is likely that the organization will be 
engaged in proceedings that would ordinarily come before him or 
will be regularly engaged in adversary proceedings in any court. 
(2) A judge should not solicit funds for any educational, religious, 
charitable, fraternal, or civic organization, or use or permit the use 
of the prestige of his office for that purpose, but he may be listed 
as an officer, director, or trustee of such an organization. He should 
not be a speaker or the guest of honor at an organization's fund rais-
ing events, but he may attend such events. 
(3) A judge should not give investment advice to such an organization, 
but he may serve on its board of directors or trustees even though it 
has the responsibility for approving investment decisions. 
C. Financial Activities. 
(1) A judge should refrain from financial and business dealings that 
tend to reflect adversely on his impartiality, interfere with the 
proper performance of his judicial duties, exploit his judicial posi-
tion, or involve him in frequent transactions with lawyers or persons 
likely to come before the court on which he serves. 
(2) Subject to the requirements of subsection (1), a judge may hold 
and manage investments, including real estate, and engage in other 
remunerative activity. 
(3) A judge should manage his investments and other financial interests 
to minimize the number of cases in which he is disqualified. As soon 
as he can do so without serious financial detriment, he should divest 
himself of investments and other financial interests that might re-
quire frequent disqualification. 
(4) Neither a judge nor a member of his family residing in his household 
should accept a gift, bequest, favor, or loan from anyone except as 
follows: 
(a) a judge may accept a gift incident to a public testimonial to him; 
books supplied by publishers on a complimentary basis for official 
use; or an invitation to the judge and his spouse to attend a bar-
related function or activity devoted to the improvement of the 
law, the legal system, or the administration of justice; 
(b) a judge or a member of his family residing in his household may 
accept ordinary social hospitality; a gift, bequest, favor, or loan 
from a relative; a wedding or engagement gift; a loan from a 
lending institution in its regular course of business on the same 
terms generally available to persons who are not judges; or a 
scholarship or fellowship awarded on the same terms applied to 
other applicants; 
(c) a judge or a member of his family residing in his household may 
accept any other gift, bequest, favor, or loan only if the donor 
is not a party or other person whose interests have come or are 
likely to come before him. 
(5) For the purposes of this section "member of his family residing in 
his household" means any relative of a judge by blood or marriage, 
or a person treated by a judge as a member of his family, who resides 
in his household. 
(6) Information acquired by a judge in his judicial capacity should not 
be used or disclosed by him in financial dealings or for any other 
purpose not related to his judicial duties. 
D. Fiduciary Activities. A judge should not serve as the executor, adminis-
trator, trustee, guardian, or other fiduciary, except for the estate, trust, 
or person of a member of his family, and then only if such service will 
not interfere with the proper performance of his judicial duties. "Mem-
ber of his family,, includes a ^pouse, child, grandchild, parent, grand-
parent, or other relative or person with whom the judge maintains a 
close familial relationship. As a family fiduciary a judge is subject to 
the following restrictions: 
(1) He should not serve if it is likely that as a fiduciary he will be en-
gaged in proceedings that would ordinarily come before him, or if 
the estate, trust, or ward becomes involved in adversary proceedings 
in the court on which he serves or one under its appellate jurisdic-
tion. 
(2) While acting as a fiduciary a judge is subject to the same restrictions 
on financial activities that apply to him in his personal capacity. 
E. Practice of Law. A judge should not practice law. 
F. Extra-judicial Appointments. A judge should not accept appointment to 
a governmental committee, commission, or other position that is con-
cerned with issues of fact or policy on matters other than the improve-
ment of the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice. A 
judge, however, may represent his country, state, or locality on cere-
monial occasions or in connection with historical, educational, and cul-
tural activities. 
CANON 6 
Compensation Received for Quasi-Judicial 
and Extra-Judicial Activities 
A judge may receive compensation and reimbursement of expenses for 
the quasi-judicial and extra-judicial activities permitted by this Code, if the 
source of such payments does not give the appearance of influencing the 
judge in his judicial duties or otherwise give the appearance of impropriety^,, 
subject to the following restrictions: 
A. Compensation. Compensation should not exceed a reasonable amount nor 
should it exceed what a person who is not a judge would receive for the 
same activity. 
B. Expense Reimbursement. Expense reimbursement should be limited to 
the actual cost of travel, food, and lodging reasonably incurred by the 
judge and, where appropriate to the occasion, by his spouse. Any payment 
in excess of such an amount is compensation. 
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CANON 7 
A Judge Should Refrain from 
Political Activity Inappropriate 
to His Judicial Office 
A. Political Conduct in General. 
(1) A judge or a candidate for election to judicial office should not: 
(a) act as a leader or hold any office in a political organization; 
(b) make speeches for a political organization or candidate or publicly 
endorse a candidate for public office; 
(c) solicit funds for or pay an assessment or make a contribution to a 
political organization or candidate, attend political gatherings, or 
purchase tickets for political party dinners, or other functions, 
except as authorized in subsection A(2); 
(2) A judge holding an office filled by public election between competing 
candidates, or a candidate for such office, may, only insofar as per-
mitted by law, attend political gatherings, speak to such gatherings on 
Jiis own behalf when he is a candidate for election or re-election, 
identify himself as a member of a political party, and contribute to 
a political party or organization. 
(3) A judge should resign his office when he becomes a candidate either 
in a party primary or in a general election for a non-judicial office, 
except that he may continue to hold his judicial office while being a 
candidate for election to or serving as a delegate in a state constitu-
tional convention, if he is otherwise permitted by law to do so. 
(4) A judge should not engage in any other political activity except on 
behalf of measures to improve the law, the legal system, or the 
administration of justice. 
B. Campaign Conduct. 
(1) A candidate, including an incumbent judge, for a judicial office that 
is filled either by public election between competing candidates or on 
the basis of a merit system election: 
(a) should maintain the dignity appropriate to judicial office, and 
should encourage members of his family to adhere taihe same 
standards of political conduct that apply to him; 
(b) should prohibit public officials or employees subject to his direc-
tion or control from doing for him what he is prohibited from 
doing under this Canon; and except to the extent authorized 
under subsection B(2) or B(3), he should not allow any other 
person to do for him what he is prohibited from doing under 
this Canon; 
(c) should not make pledges or promises of conduct in office other 
than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the 
office; announce his views on disputed legal or political issues; 
or misrepresent his identity, qualifications, present position, or 
other fact. 
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(2) A candidate, including an incumbent judge, for a judicial office that 
is filled by public election between competing candidates should not 
himself solicit or accept campaign funds, or solicit publicly stated 
support, but he may establish committees of responsible persons to 
secure and manage the expenditure of funds for his campaign and 
to obtain public statements of support for his candidacy. Such com-
mittees are not prohibited from soliciting campaign contributions 
and public support from lawyers. A candidate's committees may 
solicit funds for his campaign no earlier than [90] days before a pri-
mary election and no later than [90] days after the last election in 
which he participates during the election year. A candidate should 
not use or permit the use of campaign contributions for the private 
benefit of himself or members of his family. 
(3) An incumbent judge who is a candidate for retention in or re-election 
to office without a competing candidate, and whose candidacy has 
drawn active opposition, may campaign in response thereto and may 
obtain publicly stated support and campaign funds in the manner 
provided in subsection B(2). 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
RICHARD MADSEN and NANCY 
MADSEN, his wife, for them-
selves and all others similarly 
situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS &. 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, for itself 
and all others similarly 
situated, 
Defendants. 
UTAH BANKERS ASSOCIATION, 
Intervenor. 
C 77-0350 
ORDER 
Fiisd in United States District 
Court District of Utah 
APR 19 1979 
PAUL L BADGER 
Clerk 
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS & 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RICHARD MADSEN and NANCY 
MADSEN, 
Defendants. 
C 77-0111 
The above-entitled actions came before the court on 
April 6 and 9, 1979, for hearing on various motions^ The court,k 
having considered ,th£ memoranda of counsel and their oral argu-, 
ments, enters the following order: 
(1) Madsens1 motion to remand in C 77-0350 is denied. 
Federal question jurisdiction is present in this action by virtue 
of 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-ll(c) and the rule of North Davis Bank v. 
ADDENDUM F 
First National Bank of Lay ton, 457 F.2d 820 (10th Cir. 1972) 
(action is removable if "directly concerned with the construction 
of federal law and a determination of rights thereunder"). The 
action was timely removed in that Prudential filed a petition 
for removal on behalf of the defendant class within thirty days 
after October 12, 1977, the date when Madsens were granted leave 
to amend their complaint to allege a defendant class. Prudential 
was entitled to remove on behalf of the defendant class without 
regard to the probability or improbability of eventual certifica-
tion of the defendant class. 
(2) Madsens1 motion to dismiss for lack of federal 
question jurisdiction in C 77-0350 is denied. Important federal 
questions remain in this action. Madsens1 reliance on res judicata 
is inappropriate. Res judicata does not prevent this court from 
considering federal issues that were previously ignored by the 
state courts in the course of this litigation. No subsequent 
lawsuit is involved here. This is simply a later stage of the 
same lawsuit that was before the state courts. 
(3) The Federal Home Loan Bank Board's motion for leave 
to file an amicus brief is granted. The Board's brief, which was 
filed with the court on September 21, 1978, is received. 
(4) Madsens1 motion to continue disposition of Pruden-
tial's motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment pending 
determination of. class issues is denied. For reasons stated^ . 
below, the court is persuaded that Madsens' claim against 
Prudential is wholly without merit. Since it is manifest that 
they cannot succeed on the merits, it is unnecessary to proceed 
to class certification before resolving the controversy on the 
2 
merits. 
(5) Prudential's motions for summary judgment in both 
cases are granted. Under the federal preemption doctrine, Madsens 
have no claim against Prudential for interest on their escrow 
account. 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-ll(c) clearly precludes the relief 
the Madsens are seeking. That regulation is not subject to 
attack under the theory that it retroactively abrogates vested 
rights. There is no assurance that, under state law, Madsens 
at any time had any kind of right, much less an inviolable 
vested right, to receive interest on the escrow funds. More 
importantly, the regulation cited above does not appear to alter 
the federal law applicable to loans made before June 16, 1975, 
but instead appears to reaffirm the impact of 12 C.F.R. §§ 544.1 
("association is not required to distribute earnings on short-
term savings accounts11) and 541.5 (defining short-term savings 
account as including mortgage loan escrow accounts for taxes and 
insurance). 
(6) Intervenerfs motion to strike defendant class 
allegations is granted. Under the holdings of La Mar v. H & B 
Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461 (9th Cir. 1973) and Weiner v. 
Bank of King of Prussia» 358 F. Supp. 684 (E.D. Pa. 1973), the 
Madsens lack standing to sue defendants other than Prudential 
and cannot, as a matter of law, satisfy the Rule 23(a) require-
ments of typicality and adequate representation. Moreover, it 
appears to the court that certification of the defendant class 
would be futile in any event because of the great probability that 
defendant class members would take advantage of the "opting out" 
provisions of Rule 23(c). 
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The conspiracy and juridical relationship exceptions to 
t
^
ie
 La M51** and Weiner doctrines are not applicable in this case. 
No conspiracy or juridical relationship among defendants has been 
pleaded or shown to exist. The vague allegation of an industry-
wide practice provides insufficient basis for finding a juridical 
relationship. Moreover, the lending institutions in question 
operate under diverse bodies of law and distinctly separate 
regulatory agencies. 
(7) Madsens1 motion to maintain plaintiff and defendant 
classes is denied. The defendant class cannot be maintained for 
the reasons stated above with respect to the motion to strike 
class allegations and for the further reason that a defendant 
class action does not appear to be superior to other available 
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 
Since the defendant class cannot be maintained, neither can the 
plaintiff class survive except for those who are Prudential 
borrowers• Since those persons clearly have no cause of action, 
it serves no useful purpose to certify a class of Prudential 
borrowers. The court is persuaded that no class certification 
is now in effect. The certification order entered by the state 
court was nullified by the amendment of Madsens1 complaint to 
allege a vastly broader class of plaintiffs. 
(8) Madsens1 motion to give notice to class members 
and motion for leave to communicate with citizens committee are 
denied. 
(9) All other motions pending in these actions are 
dismissed as moot. 
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For the reasons stated herein and for the further 
reasons stated by the court on the record on April 6 and 9, 
1979, 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this M day of April, 1979. 
^i^LA/hy, 
ALDON J. AND! 
United S t a t e d D i s t r i c t Judge 
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T.-J . ; IJTAH ' 
M O R T G A G E -
Tn» MovroAOB nude this 3rd day of J * l 7 
hundred end r i f t y - e i r , h t bete 
Kenneth Rigtrup , an unamrTied anx 
of S a l t Uice ,Cbm*yof S a l t Wkt >n*d Boats of Utah, 
Mortgagor, and 
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL 1471*05 AND LOAN ASSOCIATION 
a corporation organised and edeting under the lava of the) United S t a t e s o f i a s r l e a 
WroruejRB: THAT Wnnmia, the Mortgagor is indebted to the Mortgagee in the jslnafrsl eoaa of 
ELEVEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED AND KO/lOO Dollars ($ 1 1 , 9 0 0 . 0 0 ) . •» 
evidenced by a promissory note, bearing even date herewith, for the payment of said principal sum, with interest 
thereon at the rate of four throw f ourthn per centum (l i-3A%) per annum until paid; both prineipai 
sum and the interest thereon being payable in monthly installments at the times and in the amounts as set forth 
in said promissory note, lufmnui to which is here made, at the office of the Mortgagee m S a l t Lake 
or at such other place aa the holder may designate in writing defivered or mailed to the Mortgagor, the final 
u*stallinent,ifnotnoonerpeid,tobedueandp^ -*, ltw«««~ 
Now TKKSZIUBE, for the purpoae of securing prompt payment of said note, the Mortgagor, for valuable 
consideration, reoeipi of which ia hereby acknowledged, does hereby mortgage, convey, assign, and warrant unto the 
Mortgagee, the folkmrng^ieaeribed property, situated in S a l t T-^ v« 
County of 5 ^ ^ l-%kr , and State of Utah: 
Lot 2 8 , Eaart Millbrook S u b d i v i s i o n , according t o the p l a t t h e r e o f , recorded 
In the o f f i c e of the County Recorder of s a i d Ccamty. 
together with all water right*, rights of way, easements, tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto 
U'longing, or 10 anywise now or hereafter appertaining and all rents, issues and profits thereof (provided, however, 
that the Mortgagor ahall be entitled to collect and retain the said rents, issues and profits until default hereunder), 
:UJ<1 all fixture* now or hereafter attached to or used in connection with the premises herein described; and in addition 
there'o the Tallowing described household appliances, which are, and ahall be deemed to be, fixtures and a part of 
the realty, and are a poruoc of the security for the lndebtednees herein mentioned: 
ADDENDUM G 
Eil5"^ £;lbZ 
The Mortgagor covenants and agrees with the Mortgagee aa foflowi: 
1. Ha wall paos&ptiy pay the principal of and interest on the iadebteiineai eTideneed by the amid note, at the 
times and in the manner therein provided. Privilege m itmrwmi to prepny at any time, without pieuuuu* or lea, 
the entire indebtedness or any part thereof not leai than the amount of one inetaihnent, or one uuisJietr^SsBBnV 
($100.00), whichever is less. 
2. Together with, and in addition to, the monthly payments of priaeW and interest payable under the terms 
of the note secured hereby, the Mortgagor wul pay to the Mortgagee, on Mm first day of each month until the said 
note is fully paid: 
(a) A sum equal to the ground rents, if any, next due, plus the premiums that wfll next become doe and payable 
on policies of fire and other haxard insurance covering the mortgaged property, plus imxm and sssessssents 
next due on the mortgaged property (all aa estimated by the Mortgagee, and of which the Mortgagor 
is notified) less all sums already paid therefor divided by the number of months to elapse before one 
month prior to the date when such ground rents, premiums, taxes and assessments will become ddsoqosss* 
such sums to be held by Mortgagee in trust to pay said ground rents, p* TOUUSB, taxes and sssBssmen**, 
before the same become delinquent. 
(b) The aggregate of the amounts payable pursuant to subparagraph (a) and those payable on the note secured 
hereby, shall be paid in a single payment each month, to be applied-to the following items in the order 
stated: 
(i i ground rents, taxes, assessments, fire and other hazard insurance premiums: 
(!i) interest on the indebtedness secured hereby; and 
(iu> amortization of the principal of said indebtedness. 
Any deficiency in the amount of any such aggregate monthly payment shall, unless made good by the 
Mortgagor prior to the due date of the next such pevment, constitute an event of default under thai 
mortgage. At Mortgagee's option, Mortgagor will pay a "late charge" not exceeding four per 
centum (4%) of any installment when paid more than fifteen (15) days after the due date thereof 
to cover the extra expense involved in handling delinquent payments, but such "late charge" shall 
not be payable out of the proceeds of any sale made to satisfy the indebtedness secured hereby, 
unless such proceed* are sufficient to discharge the entire indebtedness and all proper coats and 
expense* secured thereby. 
3. If the total of the payments made by the Mortgagor under (a) of paragraph 2 preceding shall exceed the 
amount of payments actually made by the Mortgagee for ground rents, taxis and sssessments, or insurance premiums, 
as the case may be, such excess shall be credited on subsequent payments to be made by the Mortgagor for such 
item*. If, however, such montldy payments shall not be sufficient to pay such items when the same shall become 
due and payable, then the Mortgagor shall pay to the Mortgagee any amount neeessa^ to make up the deficiency 
within thirty (.'10) days after written notice from the Mortgagee stating the amount of the deficiency, which notice 
may be given by mail. If at any time the Mortgagor shall tender to the Mortgagee, in accordance with the provisions 
of the note secured hereby, full payment of the entire indebtedness represented thereby, the Mortgagee shall, in 
computing the amount of such indebtedness, credit to the account of the Mortgagor any credit balance accumulated 
under the provision* of (a) of paragraph 2 hereof. If there shall he a default under any of the provisions of this 
mortgage resulticK in a public sale of the premises covered hereby, or if the Mortgagee acquires the property otherwise 
utter default, the Mortgage** shall apply, at the time of the commencement of such proceedings, or at the time the 
pn.jXTTv is otherwise acquired, the amount then remaining to the credit of Mortgagor under (a) of paragraph 2 
preceding, a* a credit on the interest accrued and unpaid and the balance to the principal then remaining unpaid 
on said note. 
4. The li<-n of rhi« instrument .'hrill remain in full force and effect during any postponement or extension of the 
tune (if pawuent of the indeMednt»*n or any pert thereof secured hereby. 
T\. M<ir:£.fC"r is lawfully seized of said premises in fee simple (or such other estate as is stated herein), and has 
C'M,<1 ::.! useful nuhr t.. niortunire. *•!!, and convey the same, and will warrant and defend the same against all 
lawful fbuina a*;-! demand.* what-oever. 11 us mortgage is a lien on said property. 
»» II' will pa;. :;!! ground rents, taxes, assesamenta. water rates, and other governmental or municipal charges. 
:n .'i.H, -.-:«<i i[ion s:u«i preiui*** except when payment for all such items has theretofore been made 
•..::•!• - a »>i pai.miapii 2 \i< re.if. n,! hv will promptly deliver the officud receipts therefor to the Mortgagee. 
r.-.»1522 rl:163 
7. Mortgagor ahall not commit or permit waate; and shall mpm»«m the property in aa good condition aa at 
present, reasonable wear and tear excepted. Upon any failure to ao maintain Mortgagee, at ita option, may eaoae 
reasonable maintenance work to be performed at the coat of Mortgagor. 
S. Mortgagor will continuously mminfjun hazard insurance, of aucb type or types and emounte aa Mortgagee 
may from time to time require, on the improvementa now or hereafter on aaid premises, and except when payment 
for all such premiums baa theretofore been made under (a) of paragraph 2 hereof, he will pay promptly when due 
any premiums therefor. All insurance shall be carried in companies approved by the Mortgagee and the policies 
and rencwaia thereof ahall be held by it and have attached thereto loss payable dauaea in favor of and ia form 
acceptable tc the Mortgagee. In event of km he will give immediate notice by mail to the Mortgagee, who may 
make proof of loaa if not made promptly by the Mortgagor. Each inaurance company fflnwiHwl ia hereby authorised 
and directed to make payment for such loaa directly to the Mortgagee instead of to the Mortgagor and the aaortpajaa-
jointry. The ina ranee proceeds, or any part thereof, may be applied by the Mortgagee, at its option, either to the 
reduction of the indebtedness hereby secured or to the restoration or repair of the property ^m-aHf In event of 
foreclosure of this mortgage, or other transfer of title to the mortgaged piuperty in extinguishment of the debt 
secured hereby, aU right, title and interest of the- Mortgagor in and to any insurance poiidea than in force abnfl 
paaa to the purchaser or grantee. 
9. Mortgagee may perform any defaulted covenantor agreement of Mortgaguf to ess* extent as Mortgagae 
ahall determine, and any moneys advanced by Mortgage© for such purposes shall bear intones* at the rate pro-
vided for in the principal indebtedness, snail thereupon become a part of the mdobtoaWea secured by feana 
instrument, ratably and on a parity with all other mdabtediwna aecured thereby, aad ahall be payable thirty 
(30) days after demand. 
10. Upon the request of the Mortgagee, the Mortgagor ahall execute and defirer a supplemental note or 
notes for the sum or sums advanced by the Mortgagee for the alteration, modnniaatiiin or improvement made 
at the Mortgayora request; or for mainUmartce of aaid premises or taxes or assessments against the same and 
for any other purpose elsewhere authorised hereunder. Said note or notes ahall be secured hereby on a pahs/ 
with and aa folly aa if the advance evidenced thereby were included in the note firat riinrririiiri above. Said 
supplemental note or notes ahall bear interest at the rate provided for in the principal nuiarrtodnaaa and shall 
be payable in enproxkaately equal monthly paymenu ioc^u ch period aa may be agreed upon by the creditor 
and debtor. Failing to agree on the maturity, the whole of the sum or sums so advanced shall be due and 
payable thirty (30) days after demand by the creditor* In no event ahall the maturity extend beyond the 
iilfimnta maturity of the note firat described above. 
11. Upon a default hi the payment of any imiahfiirtimea hereby seamed or m the periaraaenes of any of the 
terms or conditions hereof, the Mortgages may deeiare U» entire Inrfehi adman daw and foreclose thai meets*as. 
and may enter upon the property, collect all rente, income, and prohta thereof. 
12. If suit ia brought to enforce the collection of the debt aecured hereby, the court may appoint a receiver of 
the www*^*!^ premises pending foreclosure and redemption. 
13. Mortgagor will pay all eosta, and expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees, reasonably incurred by 
the Mortgagee, because of the failure on the part of the Mortgagor to perform his obligation under aaid pronuasory 
note and thia mortgage, or either. 
14. If the indebtedness secured hereby be guaranteed or insured under the Servicemen's Readjustment Act, 
aa amended, such Act and Regulations issued thereunder and in effect on the date hereof ahall govern the rights, 
dutiea and liabilities of the parties hereto, and any provisions of this or other instruments executed in connection 
with said indebtedness which are inconsistent with aaid Act or Regulations are hereby amended to conform thereto. 
The covenants herein contained ahall bind, and the benefits and advantages ahall inure to, the respective heirs, 
executors, administrators, auceeaaors and assigns of the parties hereto. Whenever used, the singular number ahall 
indude the plural, the plural the singular, the use of any gender shall include all genders, and the term "Mort-
gagee" shall indude any payee of the indebtedness hereby secured or any transferee thereof whether by operation 
of law or otherwise. 
WITNESS the hand and seal of the Mortgagor the day and year firat above written. 
r J 1533 Z.m 
STATE OF UTAH, 
COUNTY OF S a l t Lafce j 
On the 3 rd day of Ju ly , A. D. 19 5 8 , permmaJly appeared before 
me Ktnaeth P i g t r u p , an unmarried nan
 t the acner(») of the 
above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the tune. 
MY expires #fa^/_ rSffz- Salt Laka.Citjrx.0ta.l3 
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KENNETH OR SUSANNE RIGTRUP 
1957' fast PM1? brook Poad 
Salt Lake CUy, Utah 84105 
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SAnSFACnONOF 
KNOW ALL MWBT 
LOAM AflBOOATKlX, a 
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~ July IS. 1958 ~" 
161 
SiU lite 
r _ r 1 ^ 1 ^ ^ " " " Tlnd I 5 ^ ' 
rt8ta»ot 2H£ ^ f d ^ p ^ ^ U . i 
Lot 28, EAST MILLCREEK SUBDIVISION, according to thi plat thereof, recorded 
In the of f ice of the County Recorer of said County. ^f 
FttJWNTlAL fWDOLAL SAVINGS 
b y t e * * 
FSUDBITXAL 1A MNG1 AND LOAN 
__ tar V M ) 
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ROBERT J. DE BRY VZT77~\ M 7 P -; 
VALDEN P. LIVINGSTAp I LlVAtl^'' \ 
Attorneys for ?1 nin^ j_t;tri •' —~~"' 
2040 East 4800 South, Suite 203 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: (801) 278-4439 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
EPvNEST H. DIXON and LORI ANN P. 
DIXON, for themselves and all 
others similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
UNITED SAVINGS AND LOAN 
ASSOCIATION, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Civil No. C 79-1105 
The plaintiffs complain of defendant and allege: 
1. This action is brought under the provisions of 
Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure by Ernest H. 
Dixon and Lori Ann P. Dixon ("Dixon") as representatives of 
a class of plaintiffs against United Savings and Loan Association 
("United") as a representative of a class of defendants. 
2. Dixon is a resident of Salt Lake County and a 
citizen of the State of Utah. 
3. United is a Utah corporation generally engaged in 
the mortgage banking business. 
PLAINTIFF CLASS ALLEGATIONS 
4. Dixon is a representative member of a class 
composed of persons, who have borrowed money from defendant 
pursuant to a deed of-trust contract which; provides in substance 
and effect that: 
Trustor agrees to pay to beneficiary in 
addition to the monthly payments of principal 
and interest payable under the terms of said 
note, on the first day of each month until 
said note is fully paid, the following sums: 
(b) A sum equal to the ground rents, if any, 
next due, plus the premiums that will next 
ADDENDUM H 
become due and payable on policies of fire 
and other hazard insurance covering said 
property, plus taxes and assessments next due 
on the; said property, (all as estimated by 
Beneficiary) less all sums already paid therefor 
divided by the number of months to elapse 
before one month prior to the date when such 
ground rents, premiums, taxes and assessments 
will become delinquent, such sums to be held 
by Beneficiary in trust to pay said ground 
rents, premiums, taxes and special assess-
ments,, before the same become delinquent; 
and 
(c) All payments mentioned in the two 
preceding subsections of this paragraph and 
all payments to be made under the note 
secured hereby shall be added together and 
the aggregate amount thereof shall be paid 
by Trustor each month in a single payment 
to be applied by beneficiary to the following 
items in the order set forth: 
(i) premium charges under the contract 
of insurance with the Secretary of Housing 
and Urban Development or monthly charge 
(in lieu of mortgage insurance premium) 
as the case may be; 
(ii) ground rents, taxes, special assess-
ments, fre [sic] and other hazard insurance 
premiums; 
(iii) interest on the note secured hereby; 
and 
(iv) amortization of the principal of 
said note. 
5. Dixon is informed and believes, and therefore 
alleges, that the plaintiff class is composed of over 1,000 
members. The large number of class members makes it impracticable 
to join them all in this action. 
6. The issues of law and fact involved in this action 
are common to all members of the class. 
7. The claims of Dixon are typical of the claims of 
all the members of the plaintiff class. 
8. Dixon, as a member of the plaintiff class, will 
fairly and adequately represent the interests of all the 
plaintiff class members. 
9. The questions of law and fact common to the members 
of the plaintiff class predominate over any questions affecting 
only individual members, and the class action is superior to any 
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other available method for adjudication of the controversy, 
10. The prosecution of separate actions by or against 
individual members of the plaintiff class would create a risk 
of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to 
individual members of the plaintiff class which would establish 
incompatible standards of conduct for the defendant. 
DEFENDANT CLASS ALLEGATIONS 
11. United is a representative member of a class 
composed of all state-chartered banks and state-chartered savings 
and loan associations who utilize or have utilized standard trust 
deed agreements which in substance and effect contain the follow-
ing language: 
Trustor agrees to pay to beneficiary 
in addition to the monthly payments of 
principal and interest payable under the 
terms of said note, on the first day of 
each month until said note is fully paid, 
the following sums: 
(b) A sum equal to the ground rents, if 
any, next due, plus the premiums that will 
next become due and payable on policies of 
fire and other hazard insurance covering said 
property, plus taxes and assessments next 
due on the said property, (all as estimated 
by Beneficiary) less all sums already paid 
therefor divided by the number of months to 
elapse before one month prior to the date 
when such ground rents, premiums, taxes and 
assessments will become delinquent, such sums 
to be held by Beneficiary in trust to pay said 
ground rents, premiums, taxes and special assess-
ments, before the same become delinquent; and 
(c) All payments mentioned in the two 
preceding subsections of this paragraph and 
all payments to be made under the note 
secured hereby shall be added together and 
the aggregate amount thereof shall be paid 
by Trustor each month in a single payment 
to be applied by beneficiary to the following 
items in the order set forth: 
(i) premium charges under the 
contract of insurance with the Secretary 
of Housing and Urban Development or 
monthly charge (in lieu of mortgage 
insurance premium) as the case may be? 
(ii) ground rents, taxes, special 
assessments, fre [sic] and other hazard 
insurance premiums; 
(iii) interest on the note secured 
hereby; and 
(iv) amortization of the principal 
of said note. 
_ - } -
12. Dixon is informed and believes, and therefore 
alleges, that the defendant class is composed of approximately 
100 members. The large number of defendant class members 
makes it impracticable to join the-; all in this action. 
13. The issues of law and fact involved in this action 
are common to all members of the class. 
14. The claims of United are typical of the claims 
of all the members of the defendant class. 
15. United, as a member of the defendant class, 
will fairly and adequately represent the interests of all the 
defendant class members. 
16. The questions of law and fact common to the members 
of the defendant class predominate over any question affecting 
only individual member, and the class action is superior to 
any other available method of adjudication of the controversy. 
17. The prosecution of separate actions by or against 
individual members of the plaintiff class would create a risk 
of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to 
individual members of the plaintiff class which would establish 
incompatible standards of conduct for individual members of the 
defendant class. 
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
18. On August 23, 1977, Dixon entered into a contract 
with United pursuant to a standard Trust Deed contract which 
provides inter alia that: 
Trustor agrees to pay to beneficiary 
in addition to the monthly payments of 
principal and interest payable under-the-
terms of said note, on the first day of 
each month until said note is fully paid, 
the following sums: 
(b) A sum equal to the ground rents, if 
any, next due, plus the premiums that will 
next become due and payable on policies of 
fire and other hazard insurance covering 
said property, plus taxes and assessments 
next due on the said property, (all as 
estimated by Beneficiary) less all sums 
already paid therefor divided by the number 
of months to elapse before one month prior 
to the date when such ground rents, premiums, 
taxes and assessments will become delinquent, 
such sums to be held by Beneficiary in trust 
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to pay said ground rents, premiums, 
taxes and special assessments, before 
the same become delinquent; and 
(c) All payments mentioned in the 
two preceding subsections of this para-
graph and all payments to be made under 
the note secured hereby shall be added 
together and the aggregate amount thereof 
shall be paid by Trustor each month in a 
single payment to be applied by beneficiary 
to the following items in the order set 
forth: 
(i) premium charges under the 
contract of insurance with the Secretary 
of Housing and Urban Development or 
monthly charge (in lieu of mortgage 
insurance premium) as the case may be; 
(ii) ground rents, taxes, special 
assessments, fre [sic] and other hazard 
insurance premiums; 
(iii) interest on the note secured 
hereby; and 
(iv) amortization of the principal 
of said note. 
19. Dixon is informed and believes, and therefore 
alleges, that United retains such "trust" funds paid by Dixon 
for several months and up to a full year before making the 
required disbursements for taxes and insurance on behalf of 
Dixon. 
20. Dixon is informed and believes, and therefore 
alleges, that United has invested the "trust" funds paid by 
Dixon and has received substantial profits from such investments, 
which profits have been wholly retained by United. 
21. United is obligated to render an accounting to 
Dixon and to pay to Dixon all of the profits which United has 
earned from the use of the "trust" funds. 
PRAYER 
WHEREFORE, Dixon and the class he represents pray 
as follows: 
1. For an Order that United shall render an accountinq 
to Dixon and other plaintiff class members for their past use 
of "trust" funds. 
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2. For a judgment that United shall pay to Dixon and 
other plaintiff class members all of the profits which United 
has earned from the past use of the "trust"* funds. 
3. For an order that United shall in the future render 
an annual accounting to plaintiff class members for their 
future use of the "trust" funds. 
4. For an order that United shall make a future annual 
payment to Dixon and other plaintiff class members for future 
profits which United might earn from the future use of the 
"trust" funds. 
5. For a reasonable attorney's fee paid to the attorney 
for the plaintiff class, plus costs of suit. 
Plaintiffs1 address: 
379 5 South Lorna Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84120 
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? 
I ROBERT J. DE BRY 
;f VALDEN P. LIVINGSTON 
!| Attorneys for Plaintiff 
- 2040 East 4800 South, Suite 203 
t Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
jj Telephone: (801) 278-4439 
I IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 
[I ROGER HAL READ and | ELIZABETH W. READ, for 
!l themselves and all others 
!j similarly situated, 
| Plaintiffs, 
I ™-
j? AMERICAN EQUITY CORPORATION 
jj for itself and all others 
ij similarly situated, 
Defendant, 
jj Plaintiffs complain and allege: 
1 
i 1. This action is brought under the provisions of 
jj Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure by Roger Hal Read 
B and Elizabeth W. Read ("Read") as representatives of a class of 
J} plaintiffs against American Equity Corporation ("Equity*) as a 
M 
; representative of a class of defendants, 
u 
!
2« Read is a resident of Salt Lake County and a citize: 
of the State of Utah. 
3. Equity is a Utah corporation generally engaged in 
i 
j] the mortgage banking business, 
J 
!
PLAINTIFF CLASS ALLEGATIONS 
4. Read is a representative laember of a class composes? 
J of persons who have borrowed money-in Utah-from mortgage banking 
I companies domiciled in Utah pursuant to trust deed contracts whic 
i |* provide in substance and effect that: 
i» 
J Together with, and in addition to, the 
monthly payments of principal and interest 
payable under the terms of the note secured 
ADDENDUM I 
hereby, the Mortgagor will pay to the 
Mortgagee, as trustee (under the terms 
of this trust as hereinafter stated), 
on the first day of each month until the 
said note is fully paid: 
(a) A sum equal to the ground rents, if any, 
next due, plus the premiums that will 
next become due and payable on policies 
of fire and other hazard insurance 
covering the mortgaged propertyf plus 
taxes and assessments next due on the 
mortgaged property (all as estimated by 
the Mortgagee, and of which the Mortgagor 
is notified) less all sums already paid 
therefor divided by the number of months 
to elapse before one month prior to the 
date when such ground rents, premiums, 
taxes and assessments will become delin-
quent* such sums to be held by Mortgagee 
in trust to pay said ground rents, 
premiums, taxes and assessments, before 
the same become delinquent. 
(b) The aggregate of the amounts payable 
pursuant to subparagraph (a) and those 
payable on the note secured hereby, 
shall be paid in a single payment each 
month, to be applied to the following 
items in the order stated: 
(i) ground rents, taxes, assessments , 
fire and other hazard insurance 
premiums; 
(ii) interest on the indebtedness 
secured hereby; and 
(iii) amortization of the principal 
of said indebtedness, 
5* Read is informed and believes, and therefore 
alleges, that the plaintiff class is composed of over 10f000 
members. The large number of class members makes it impracticable 
to join them all in this action. 
6. The issues of law and fact involved in this action 
are common to all members of the class, 
7. The claims of Read are typical of the claims of 
all the members of the plaintiff class, 
8. Read, as a member of the plaintiff class, will 
fairly and adequately represent the interests of all the plaintiff 
class members. 
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9. The questions of law and fact common to the 
members of the plaintiff class predominate over any question 
affecting only individual membersf and the class action is 
superior to any other available method for adjudication of the 
controversy. 
10. The prosecution of separate actions by or against 
individual members of the plaintiff class would create a risk 
of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to 
individual members of the plaintiff class which would establish 
incompatible standards of conduct for individual members of the 
defendant class. 
DEFENDANT CLASS ALLEGATIONS 
11. Equity is a representative member of a class 
composed of mortgage banking institutions domiciled in the 
State of Utah who have loaned money within the State of Utah 
to persons pursuant to trust deed contracts which provide in 
substance and effect that: 
Together with, and in addition to, the 
monthly payments of principal and interest 
payable -under the terms of the note secured 
hereby, the Mortgagor will pay to the 
Mortgagee, as trustee (under the terms 
of this trust as hereinafter stated), 
on the first day of each month until the 
said note is fully paid: 
(a) A sum equal to the ground rents, if any, 
next due, plus the premiums that will 
next become due and payable on policies 
of fire and other hazard insurance 
covering the mortgaged property, plus 
taxes and assessments next due on the 
mortgaged property (all as estimated by 
the Mortgagee, and of which the Mortgagor 
is notified) less all sums already paid 
therefor divided by the number of months 
to elapse before one month prior to the 
date when such ground rents, premiums, 
taxes and assessments will become delin-
quent , such sums to be held by Mortgaqee 
in trust to pay said ground rents, 
premiums, taxes and assessments, before 
the same become delinquent. 
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(b) The aggregate of the amounts payable 
pursuant to subparagraph (a) and those 
payable on the note secured hereby, 
shall be paid in a single payment 
each month, to be applied to the 
following items in the order stated: 
(i) ground rents, taxes, assessments, 
fire and other hazard insurance 
premiums; 
(ii) interest on the indebtedness 
secured hereby- and 
(iii) amortization of the principal 
of said indebtedness. 
12. Read is informed and believesf and therefore 
alleges, that the defendant class is compDsed of approximately 
100 members. The large number of defendant clas-s members 
makes it impracticable to join them all in this action* 
13. The issues of law and fact involved in this action 
are common to all members of the class. 
14. The claims of Equity are typical of the claims 
of all the members of the defendant class. 
15. Equity, as a member of the defendant class, 
will fairly and adequately represent the interests of all the 
defendant class members, 
16. The questions of law and fact common to the members 
of the defendant class predominate over any question affecting 
only individual members, and the class action is superior to 
any other available method of adjudication of the controversy^ 
17. The prosecution of separate actions by or against 
individual members of the plaintiff class would create a 
risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to 
individual members of the plaintiff class which would establish 
incompatible standards of conduct for individual members of the 
defendant class. 
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IV 
PLAINTIFFS* CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
18. (a) ' On September 5, 1973, Read entered into a 
trust deed contract with Equity pursuant to a standard trust 
deed contract which provides inter alia that: 
Together withf and in addition to, the 
monthly payments of principal and interest 
payable under the terms of the note secured 
hereby, the Mortgagor will pay to the 
Mortgagee, as trustee (under the terms 
of this trust as hereinafter stated), 
on the first day of each month until the 
said note is fully paid; 
(a) A sum equal to the ground rents, if anyf 
.next due, plus the premiums that will 
next become due and payable on policies 
of fire and other hazard insurance 
covering the mortgaged property, plus 
•taxes and assessments next due on the 
mortgaged property (all as estimated 
by the Mortgagee, and of which the 
Mortgagor is notified) less all sums 
already paid therefor divided by the 
number of months to elapse before one 
month prior to the date when such ground 
rents, premiums, taxes and assessments 
will become delinquent, such sums to 
be held by Mortgagee in trust to pay 
said ground rents, premiums, taxes 
and assessments, before the same 
become delinquent. 
(b) The aggregate of the amounts payable 
pursuant to subparagraph (a) and those 
payable on the note secured hereby, 
shall be paid in a single payment 
each monthf to be applied to the 
following items in the order stated: 
(i) ground rents, taxes, assessments, 
fire and other hazard insurance 
premiums; 
(ii) interest on the indebtedness 
secured hereby; and 
(iii) amortization of the principal 
of said indebtedness. 
(b) Plaintiff is informed and believes, and 
therefore, alleges, that members of the plaintiff class have 
entered into trust deed contracts with members of the defendant 
-5-
class using standard trust deed contracts which provide that: 
Together with, and in addition to, the 
monthly payments of principal and interest 
payable ,under the terms of the note secured 
hereby, the Mortgagor will pay to the 
Mortgagee, as trustee (under the terms 
of this trust as hereinafter stated), 
on the first day of each month until the 
said note is fully paid: 
(a) A sum equal to the ground rents, if any, 
next due, plus the premiums that will 
next become due and payable on policies 
of fire and other hazard insurance 
covering the mortgaged property, plus 
taxes and assessments next due on the 
mortgaged property (all as estimated by 
the Mortgagee, and of which the Mortgagor 
is notified) less all sums already paid 
therefor divided by the number of months 
to elapse before one month prior to the 
'date when such ground rents, premiums, 
taxes and assessments will become delin-
quent, such sums to be held by Mortgagee 
in trust to pay said ground rents, 
premiums, taxes and assessmentsf before 
the same become delinquent. 
(b) The aggregate of the amounts payable 
pursuant to subparagraph (a) and those 
payable on the note secured hereby, 
shall be paid in a single payment 
each month, to be applied to the 
following items in the order stated; 
(i) ground rents, taxes, assessmentsf 
fire and other hazard insurance 
premiums; 
(ii) interest on the indebtedness 
secured hereby; and 
(iii) amortization of the principal 
of said indebtedness, 
19. (a) Read is informed and believes, and therefore 
alleges, that Equity retains such "trust" funds paid by Read 
for several months and up to a full year before making the 
required disbursements for taxes and insurance on behalf of 
Read. 
(b) Read is informed and believes, and therefore 
alleges, that the defendant class members retain "trust" payments 
paid by plaintiff class members for several months and up to 
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one year before making the required disbursements for taxes 
and insurance on behalf of the plaintiff class members. 
20. (a) Read is informed and believes, and therefore 
alleges, that Equity has invested the •trust" funds paid by 
Read and has received substantial profits from such investments, 
which profits have been wholly retained by Equity. 
(b) Read is informed and believes, and therefore 
alleges, that defendant class members have invested the "trust" 
funds paid by the plaintiff class members and have received 
substantial profits from such investments, which profits have 
been wholly retained by defendant class members.* 
21. (a) Equity is obligated to render an accounting 
to Read and to pay to Read all of the profits which Equity has 
earned from the use of the "trust" funds. 
(b) Defendant class members are obligated to 
render an accounting to plaintiff class members and to pay to 
such class members all of the profits which defendant class 
members have earned from the use of the "trust" funds. 
PRAYER 
WHEREFORE, Read and the class he represents pray 
as follows: 
1. For an order that Equity and other defendant class 
members shall render an accounting to Read and other plaintiff 
class members for their past due use of "trust" funds -
2. For a judgment that Equity and other defendant 
class members shall pay to Read and other plaintiff class members 
all of the profits which defendant class members have earned 
from the past use of the "trust" funds, 
3. For an order that Equity and other defendant class 
members shall in the future render an annual accounting to 
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plaintiff class members for their future use of the 'trust* 
funds. 
<• For *an order that Equity and other defendant 
class members shall make a future annual payment to Read and 
other plaintiff class members for future profits which defendant 
class members might earn from the future use of the "trust" 
funds. 
5. For a reasonable attorney's fee paid to the 
attorney for the plaintiff classf plus costs of suit, 
DATED this day of August,, 1977. 
DE BR^ 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Plaintiffs• address: 
3127 South 2000 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
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ROBERT J. DEBRY - A0849 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
965 East 4800 South, Suite 2 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84117 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ERNEST H. DIXON and LORI ANN 
P. DIXON, for themselves and 
all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UNITED SAVINGS & LOAN 
ASSOCIATION, 
Defendants. 
i MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE 
i Civil No. C-79-1105 
i (Judge Kenneth Rigtrup) 
Pursuant to Rule 42 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
plaintiffs move for an order consolidating the above 
entitled cause with the following actions. 
RICHARD MADSEN and NANCY MADSEN, his 
wife, for themselves and all others 
similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs 
vs. 
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVING & LOAN 
ASSOCIATION, for itself and all others 
similarly situated 
Defendants 
Civil No. 226073 
and 
RICHARD MADSEN and NANCY MADSEN, his 
wifef for themselves and all others 
similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs 
vs. 
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVING & LOAN 
ASSOCIATION, for itself and all others 
similarly situated 
Defendants 
Civil No. 79-8404 
The grounds for this motion are that each of the 
foregoing cases has similar or identical issues of fact and 
law. 
Moreover, each of the foregoing cases pleads a 
class action. These classes may be overlapping or in some 
cases identical. Or, in other words, a ruling on class 
issues in any one case may directly affect the other case. 
DATED this /Q day of QM<UJU*J~ r 1984. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys^or Plaintiff 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MOTION TO CONSOLIDATED was mailed this /% day of 
CLuQj/n't-, 1984 by depositing same in the U.S. Mail, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
Joseph Palmer 
MOYLE & DRAPER 
600 Deseret Plaza 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Peter Billings 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
800 Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Harvey Simon 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board 
1700 G Street, N.W. 
Washington D.C. 20552 
John P. Ashton 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
424 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Edward McDonough 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & 
MCDONOUGH 
800 Walker Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
'/ncftU 
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ROBERT J. DEBRY - A0849 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
965 East 4800 South, Suite 2 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84117 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROGER HAL READ AND ELIZABETH 
W. READ, for themselves and 
all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
AMERICAN EQUITY CORPORATION, 
for itself and all others 
similarly situated, 
Defendant* 
MOTION TO 
CONSOLIDATE 
Civil No. C-244219 
(Judge Kenneth Rigtrup) 
Pursuant to Rule 42 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
plaintiffs move for an order consolidating the above 
entitled cause with the following actions. 
RICHARD MADSEN and NANCY MADSEN, his 
wife, for themselves and all others 
similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVING & LOAN ASSO-
CIATION, for itself and all others 
similarly situated 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 226073 
ADDENDUM K 
* * * 
RICHARD MADSEN and NANCY MADSEN, his 
wife, for themselves and all others 
similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVING & LOAN ASSOCIA-
TION, for itself and all others simi-
larly situated, 
Defendants, 
Civil No. 79-8404 
* * * 
ERNEST H. DIXON and LORI ANN P. DIXON, 
for themselves and all others similarly 
situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UNITED SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. C-79-1105 
The grounds for this motion are that each of the 
foregoing cases has similar or identical issues of fact and 
law. 
Moreover, each of the foregoing cases pleads a 
class action. These classes may be overlapping or in some 
cases identical. Or, in other words, a ruling on class 
issues in any one case may directly affect the other case. 
DATED this ^ day of ^j/f^/j^ * , 1984. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MOTION TO CONSOLIDATED was mailed this £ day of 
^,iV^/l/" 1984 by depositing same in the U.S. Mail, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
Joseph Palmer 
MOYLE & DRAPER 
60Q Deseret Plaza 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Peter Billings 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
800 Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Harvey Simon 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board 
1700 G Street, N.W. 
Washington D.C. 20552 
John P. Ashton 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
424 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Edward McDonough 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & 
MCDONOUGH 
800 Walker Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
$/<r)<7a.J 
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JOSEPH J- PALMER, and 
REID E. LEWIS, of 
MOYLE & DRAPER 
Attorneys for Prudential Federal Savings & Loan 
Association 
600 Deseret Plaza 
No. 15 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-0250 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
* * * * * * * * 
RICHARD MADSEN and NANCY 
MADSEN, his wife, for them-
selves and all other simi-
larly situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS & 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, for itself 
and all others similarly 
situated, 
Defendant, 
UTAH BANKERS ASSOCIATION. 
RICHARD MADSEN and NANCY 
MADSEN, his wife, for them-
selves and all others simi-
larly situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS & 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, for itself 
and for all others similarly 
situated, 
Defendant. 
Civil No. 81-0850A 
("Madsen I") 
ANSWER 
Civil No. 80-0045A 
(-Madsen II") 
•n n n n ^ T n r m * T 
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS & 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, 
Third-Party ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
THE FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK ) 
BOARD, an instrumentality ) 
of the United States and ) 
RICHARD T. PRATT, its ) 
Chairman, ) 
Third-Party ) 
Defendants. ) 
• * * * * • • • 
Defendant Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Associa-
tion answers plaintiffs1 Substitute Third Amended Complaint: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
1. The Substitute Third Amended Complaint fails to 
state a claim against defendant upon which relief can be 
granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
2. The Substitute Third Amended Complaint fails to 
state a claim for the alleged plaintiff class. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
3. The Substitute Third Amended Complaint fails to 
state a claim against the alleged defendant class upon which 
relief can be granted. 
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FOURTH DEFENSE 
Answering each paragraph of the substitute Third 
Amended Complaint, defendant: 
4* Denies paragraph 1. 
5. Denies paragraph 2. 
6. Admits paragraph 3. 
7. Paragraph 4 is not an allegation of fact, but 
defendant denies it. 
8. Denies paragraph 5. 
9. Denies paragraph 6. 
10. Denies paragraph 7. 
11. Denies paragraph 8 and alleges most of those 
issues, if not all of them, were decided in Nixon v. American 
Savings & Loan Association by the Utah Supreme Court in June, 
1981. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
Denies 
Denies 
Denies 
Denies 
Denies 
Denies 
Denies 
Denies 
paragraph 
paragraph 
paragraph 
paragraph 
paragraph 
paragraph 
paragraph 
paragraph 
8 [sic] on p. 4. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16 and alleges most of these 
issues, if not all of them, were decided in Nixon v. American 
Savings & Loan Association by the Utah Supreme Court in June, 
1981. 
20. Denies paragraph 17. 
21. Denies paragraph 18. 
22. Denies paragraph 19. 
23. Denies paragraph 20. 
24. Admits paragraph 21(a) and denies paragraph 21(b). 
25. Admits that on certain mortgages for its 
customers, Prudential retains the funds before making the 
required disbursements. All other allegations in paragraph 22 
are denied. 
26. Denies paragraph 23. 
27. Denies paragraph 24. 
28. Denies paragraph 25. 
29. Denies paragraph 26. 
30. Denies paragraph 27r but admits the letter, 
Exhibit A to the Substitute Third Amended Complaint, was for-
warded to plaintiffs. 
31. Denies paragraph 28. 
32. Denies paragraph 29. 
33. Denies paragraph 30. 
34. Denies paragraph 31. 
35. Denies paragraph 32. 
36. Denies paragraph 33 but admits that prior to July 
25f 1979, Prudential, in some instances, required the estab-
lishment or continuance of a reserve account, or was required 
by federal or quasi-federal agencies regulating Prudential or 
operating in the secondary mortgage market to require the 
establishment or continuance of a reserve account. 
37. Denies paragraph 34 but admits the letter, 
Exhibit A to the Substitute Third Amended Complaint, was for-
warded to plaintiffs. 
38. Denies paragraph 35. 
39. Denies that the contract between the Madsens and 
Prudential is impaired. Admits the Madsens did not reply to 
the form letter but alleges Madsens' counsel replied in the 
form of the letter of September 4, 1979, attached to the 
Substitute Third Amended Complaint as Exhibit B; denies the 
other allegations and conclusions of law alleged in paragraph 
36. 
40. Denies paragraph 37. 
41. Denies Madsen or the alleged plaintiff class 
members had "vested rights'1 or "a right at common law to 
receive earnings or profits"; alleges that the statutory 
operation is a conclusion of law and denies the other 
allegations in paragraph 38. 
42. Denies paragraph 39 and alleges that while plain-
tiffs are governed by the provisions of § 7-17-3 Utah Code Ann. 
(1953), Prudential is governed by federal law; denies the other 
allegations in paragraph 39. 
43. Admits paragraph 40. 
44. Denies paragraph 41 and alleges that Exhibits C 
through F are immaterial. 
45. Denies paragraph 42. 
46. Denies paragraph 43. 
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47. Denies all allegations in the Substitute Third 
Amended Complaint not specifically admitted in this Answer. 
FIFTH DEFENSE 
48. The matters alleged in the Substitute Third 
Amended Complaint have been previously determined by this Court 
adversely to plaintiffs in Madsen v. Prudential Federal Savings 
& Loan Association and Prudential Federal Savings & Loan As-
sociation v. Madsen, C 77-0350 and C 77-0111 respectively, the 
latter being the same case, before remand and second removal to 
this Court, as C 81-0850 A ("Madsen I M). Plaintiffs are bound 
thereby. 
SIXTH DEFENSE 
49. The claims set forth in the Substitute Third 
Amended Complaint are barred by estoppel, laches or waiver, 
among other reasons by virtue of the facts that plaintiffs 
closed the mortgage transaction knowing that no interest or 
earnings would be paid on the reserve account and moreover that 
plaintiffs paid the monthly payments on the reserve account for 
more than eleven years without asking for or receiving interest 
or earnings thereon, all to the extreme prejudice of defendant, 
then a mutual association, in permitting it to establish 
reserves, conduct its business and distribute its net earnings 
to association members in the manner provided by federal law 
without provision for payment of earning or interest to 
plaintiffs. 
SEVENTH DEFENSE 
50. The claims set forth in the Substitute Third 
Amended Complaint are barred by limitations, including those 
provided in Title 7 Chapter 17, U.C.A. 1953, S 78-12-23(2), 
U.C.A. 1953 (six years on written contracts) or § 78-12-25 
(four years on open account or general actions) or § 
78-12-26(2) (three years on personal property), 
EIGHTH DEFENSE 
51. A long-standing custom and usage in the savings 
and loan industry in 1964, and the 1960fs, was that interest or 
earnings would not be paid on reserve accounts and conversely 
that borrowers would not be charged for the service provided in 
administering the reserves, including the collection of the 
reserves, the determination of real estate taxes and insurance 
premiums, the prompt payment thereof so as to avoid default, 
and the accounting therefor. 
NINTH DEFENSE 
52. Defendant-is a .savings and loan association 
chartered under the laws of the United States and is regulated 
and supervised in its operations as a mortgage lender and 
depository under laws and regulations of the United States. 
53. Loans secured by first mortgages or first deeds 
of trust on real property made by defendant, including the loan 
to plaintiffs and the loans to all members of the alleged 
plaintiff class, are made pursuant to applicable federal laws 
and regulations. Such loans are made either to be insured or 
guaranteed by agencies, including quasi-federal agencies, of 
the United States government or in such form and subject to 
such provisions as to be eligible for purchase by agencies 
(including quasi-federal agencies) of the United States or 
created by laws of the United States. 
54. Provisions for payment by the mortgagors of 
reserves sufficient to meet property taxes and premiums for 
hazard insurance on the real estate constituting the security 
for loans made by defendant are either authorized or required 
by applicable federal laws and regulations or policies and 
procedures of federal instrumentalities. 
55. In particular, the following provision of the 
regulations (12 C.F.R. § 545.6-11 (c)) of the Federal Home Loan 
Bank Board is applicable to obligations of defendant and to the 
claims of some members of the plaintiff class alleged in 
plaintiffs1 Substitute Third Amended Complaint: 
A Federal association which makes a loan on or after 
June 16, 1975, on the security of a single-family 
dwelling occupied or to be occupied by the borrower 
(except such a loan for which a-bona fide commitment 
was made before that date)- shall pay interest on any 
escrow account maintained in connection with such a 
loan (1) if there is in effect a specific statutory 
provision or provisions of the state in which such 
savings and loan associations, mutual savings banks 
and similar institutions are generally required to pay 
interest on such escrow accounts, and (2) at not less 
than that rete requircsd to bepaid by such state-char-
tered institutions but: not to exceed the rate being 
paid by the Federal association in its regular ac-
counts (as defined in Section 526.1 of this chapter). 
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Except as provided by contract, a Federal association 
shall have no obligation to pay interest on escrow 
accounts apart from the duties imposed by this para-
graph. (Emphasis added). 
Until 1979 there was no statute in effect in Utah with respect 
to such accounts. 
56. In 1979r the Federal Home Loan Bank Board adopted 
the following regulation (12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(c)), which is 
applicable to Prudential and is applicable to the claims of 
some members of the plaintiff class alleged in plaintiffs' 
Substitute Third Amended Complaint: 
Payment of interest on escrow accounts. (1) An 
association shall pay interest on an escrow account 
maintained in connection with a loan, if: 
(i) The loan is on the security of a 
single-family dwelling occupied or to be occupied by 
the borrower; 
(ii) The loan was made after June 15, 1975, and 
no bona fide loan commitment was made before that 
date; and 
(iii) A specific statutory provision(s) of the 
State in which the security property is located 
generally requires State-Chartered savings and loan 
associations, mutual savings banks, and similar 
institutions but shall not exceed the rate the Federal 
association pays on regular accounts. 
(3) Unless obligated by contract, a Federal 
association shall have no obligator), other than under 
this paragraph (c), to pay interest on escrow accounts. 
57. Whether the reserve requirements in the trust 
deed entered into between defendant and plaintiffs create a 
"contract", within the meaning of the foregoing regulations, as 
opposed to an obligation implied by law, on the part of 
defendant to pay interest or otherwise account for earnings or 
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other benefits, if any, on such funds, is a matter governed by 
federal law. 
58. Defendant did not "contract", within the meaning 
of the Regulation, to pay interet or earnings, or to account to 
its borrowers therefore, and hence, even if there were such an 
obligation implied by law (and defendant denies any such 
implied obligation), under the foregoing regulations or under 
applicable federal law, defendant is not required to pay 
interest or otherwise account to its borrowers for earnings or 
other benefits from such accounts. 
TENTH DEFENSE 
59. Plaintiffs have failed to exhaust administrative 
remedies in that Defendant is governed and controlled by the 
Fedeal Home Loan Bank Board and plaintiffs have not pleaded 
that they have complained to that agency and been denied. 
ELEVENTH DEFENSE 
60. The Plaintiffs have failed to join an 
indispensible party, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, or if 
this action is determined to be a.class action, the federal and 
quasi-federal agencies who insure, guarantee or purchase 
various loans for borrowers and defendant. 
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TWELFTH DEFENSE 
61. There is no private cause of action against 
Defendant. The only enforcement authority against Prudential 
is the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (12 U.S.C. S 1464(d)). 
THIRTEENTH DEFENSE 
62. The Plaintiffs have no standing to sue for other 
borrowers. 
^FOURTEENTH DEFENSE 
62. The Plaintiffs have no standing to sue other 
alleged lenders. 
WHEREFORE, defendant prays that the Substitute Third 
Amended Complaint be dismissed with prejudice, that defendant 
be awarded its costs, and that the Court grant such further 
relief to the defendant as shall seem just. 
DATED this 7£f day of December, 1981. 
MOYLE & DRAPER 
Rel!<3^ E. Lewis 
Attorneys for Defendant Prucr^ntial 
Federal Savings & Loan Association 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 2~/ day of December, 
1981, a copy of the Answer to Substitute Third Amended 
Complaint was mailed to the following: 
Robert J. Debry 
2040 East 4800 South, Suite 203 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Harvey Simon 
Office of General Counsel 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board 
1700 G. Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20552 
Peter Billings 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
800 Continential Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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